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I. INTRODUCTION
Controversies over the fate of the records and archives of the Iraqi Ba'ath
party in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War and debates over the role of
international law in their protection have become increasingly fierce. In April
2008, the Society of American Archivists alleged that a United States-based
organization seized certain Ba'ath party records, now in the custody of the
Hoover Institution at Stanford University, through acts of "pillage" in violation
of international law and demanded their return to Iraq.1 In October 2008, the
Director General of the Iraqi National Archives, Saad Eskander, condemned
the United States as "the hungriest scavenger" of other nations' records and
demanded the "repatriation of the Iraqi records illegally seized by [U.S.]
military and intelligence agencies."
2
The U.S. government fanned the flames by offering access to selected
researchers to the "vast number of documents" obtained during the war in Iraq
for the purpose of conducting "political, social, and cultural" research on the
former Ba'ath regime and Iraqi society.3 Meanwhile, on March 13, 2009, the
United States became a party to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, which seeks to protect
cultural property--defined to include "archives"--during war subject to the
demands of imperative military necessity.4 As a result of U.S. ratification,
1. See Soc'y of Am. Archivists & Ass'n of Canadian Archivists, SAA/ACA Joint
Statement on Iraqi Records (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.archivists.org/statements/IraqiRecords.
asp; see also Hugh Eakin, Iraqi Files in U.S.: Plunder or Rescue?, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008, at
El (describing the ongoing debate concerning the location of the Ba'ath party archives); Jon
Wiener, Over Pages, War Rages, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at AI9 (arguing for the return of the
Ba'ath party archives to Iraq).
2. Saad Eskander, Minerva Research Initiative: Searching for the Truth or Denying the
Iraqis the Rights to Know the Truth? Soc. SCI. RESEARCH COUNCIL, Oct. 29, 2008, http://essays.
ssrc.org/minerva/2008/l 0/29/eskander/ [hereinafter Eskander, Minerva Research Initiative].
3. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, U.S. ARMY RESEARCH OFFICE, BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT
No. W911INF-08-R-0007, IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT 19 (2008) [hereinafter IRAQI
PERSPECTIVES PROJECT].
4. U.N. Educ., Sci. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event ofArmed Conflict (The Hague, 14 May 1954) - Deposit of an Instrument of
Ratification by the United States of America, U.N. Doc. LA/DEP/2009/018 [hereinafter Deposit
of Ratification]; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, art. 1-2, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 106-1, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter
1954 Hague Convention]. The Senate gave its advice and consent, subject to four understandings
[Vol. 59: 10011002
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Director General Eskander claims that the United States is required "to return
all current and non-current records of the occupied Iraq, including the archive
of the Ba'ath party."
5
Such controversies betray widespread confusion about the legal status of
records and archives in war, an issue that marks the intersection of three
historically ambiguous concepts: "archives," "cultural property," and "military
necessity." For example, "archives" can encompass records of considerable
cultural and historical value, on the one hand; documents of significant
military, political, or intelligence value, on the other; and files, such as those of
the Ba'ath party, that may fall into both categories. 6 This breadth complicates
the determination of whether records and archives are entitled to the protected
legal status of "cultural property" as well as the definition of the circumstances
under which military necessity may justify their destruction or seizure. The
resulting uncertainty may invite reliance on international legal protections for
records and archives in war where none may exist. This may fuel, rather than
resolve, controversies over the capture of these records and archives during
war and the obligation, if any, to return them in peace.
This Article seeks to clarify the legal status of records and archives in war
on the basis that resolving controversies, such as those related to the Ba'ath
party records, requires a realistic assessment of the limitations of international
law. The need for greater clarity is further highlighted by the exponential
growth in the importance of documents, records, and archives in a modem
state and the corresponding expansion in their use for military, intelligence,
legal, and political purposes. For example, in the Revolutionary War, the
United States captured hundreds of documents; 7 in World War I, United States
forces seized more than fifty linear feet of enemy records;' in World War II,
the United States captured "[b]ushels, tons, and truckloads of documents" ;9
and one declaration, on September 28, 2008. S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-26 (2008). For background
on the 1954 Hague Convention see ROGER O'KEEFE, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
IN ARMED CONFLICT passim (2006); Jlki TOMAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN
THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICTpassim (1996); and UNESCO, Review of the Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague Convention of 1954)
U.N. DOC. CLT-93/WS/12 (1993) (prepared by Patrick J. Boylan) [hereinafter Review of the
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict]. For a
discussion of the effect of armed conflict on archives, see George Mackenzie, From Solferino to
Sarajevo: Armed Conflict, International Law, and Archives, in POLITICAL PRESSURE AND THE
ARCHIVAL RECORD 239 (Margaret Procter et al. eds., 2005).
5. Eskander, Minerva Research Initiative, supra note 2.
6. See infra Part H.A.
7. Philip P. Brower, The US. Army's Seizure and Administration of Enemy Records up to
World War 11, 26 AM. ARCHIVIST 191, 195 (1963).
8. Id. at 206.
9. Dagmar Horna Perman, Microfilming of German Records in the National Archives, 22
AM. ARCHIVIST 433, 433 (1959).
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and in the Second Gulf War, the United States captured documents and records
from Iraq that were measured in both "miles" and "terabytes."'
l0
Part I of this Article describes the various, and sometimes conflicting, values
that records and archives represent and the resulting challenges for meaningful
legal protection. Part II briefly outlines international law relevant to records
and archives, including laws that govern cultural property and the often severe
laws of war that may not only allow the seizure of enemy records pursuant to
military necessity, but also may convert them into the property of the capturing
state. Part III analyzes the ongoing controversies surrounding three different
groups of Ba'ath party records and archives, which illustrate the operation and
limitations of international law. Part IV concludes that, although the nature of
records and archives may prevent international legal standards that are both
robust and enforceable, international law nevertheless has an important role to
play in supporting realistic and feasible measures for their preservation.
II. THE NATURE OF RECORDS AND ARCHIVES IN WAR
A. Archives, Records, and Documents
The distinction between archives, records, and documents has always been
difficult to define. During World War II, for example, special Monuments,
Fine Arts, and Archives (MFA&A) units within the United States Armed
Forces experienced difficulties accomplishing their mission to protect
"archives" after initially defining the term expansively to include all types of
documents, regardless of their age or whether they were public or private."
Similarly, early drafts of the 1954 Hague Convention were complicated by the
acknowledgment that 'archives' is interpreted in very different ways, from
country to country."' 12 Generally, "records" are documents (a much broader
term) that evidence the official activities of a public or private institution,
agency, or government.' 3  "Archives," in turn, are those records that are
10. See Kathleen T. Rhem, Bush: A Free Iraq Will Lead to a More Secure United States,
AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., July 30, 2003, http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID =
28652 (reporting President Bush's discussion on the need to analyze "literally the miles of
documents that we have uncovered"); Transcript of Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable,
FED. NEWS SERV. (Oct. 10, 2007), http://www.defense.gov/Blog-files/Blogassets/MGHOGG.
pdf (reporting Brigadier General Kevin Bergner's statements regarding document exploitation of
"literally terabytes of electronic files" captured in Iraq).
11. AM. COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION AND SALVAGE OF ARTISTIC AND HISTORIC
MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION
AND SALVAGE OF ARTISTIC AND HISTORIC MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS 104 (1946).
12. UNESCO, RECORDS OF THE CONFERENCE CONVENED BY UNESCO HELD AT THE
HAGUE FROM 21 APRIL TO 14 MAY 1954 308 (1961) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE 1954 HAGUE
CONVENTION].
13. 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (2006) (defining federal "records" as including "all books, papers,
maps, photographs... or other documentary materials... made or received by an agency of the
United States Government ... in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved
1004 [Vol. 59: 1001
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selected, usually when no longer in current use, for long-term preservation
because of their lasting historical value. 14 Thus, land titles, property registers,
and tax rolls; official documents of agencies, ministries, courts, and political
parties; diplomatic correspondence and military plans and orders; and the
formal documents of birth, citizenship, marriage, and death are all examples of
documents that begin as records and are preserved as archives.
B. The Value ofArchives and Records in War
Special attributes of records and archives heighten both their value and
exposure to risk during armed conflict. First, they are often unique, original
documents for which copies may not exist, and are therefore irreplaceable.' 5
Second, their meaning and importance often rely on the context that their
organization and other documents provide. 16 Thus, the loss of some records
may significantly impact the meaning and value of those that survive. 17 Third,
the continuity and integrity of custody over records and archives can enhance,
or alternatively compromise, their legitimacy and perceived authenticity. 18 A
record's displacement, for example, can affect its later admissibility as
evidence in a court proceeding. Finally, the different values, including
... by that agency ... as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures,
operations, or other activities of the Government").
14. 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (2006). "Archives" can describe both the selected records as well as
the depositary in which they are housed. See id. (authorizing the National Archives to "accept for
deposit" records determined "to have sufficient historical or other value to warrant their continued
preservation by the United States Government").
15. See UNESCO, Memory of the World: Lost Memory-Libraries and Archives Destroyed
in the Twentieth Century, 20, U.N. Doc. CII-96/WS/1 (Mar. 1996) (prepared by Hans van der
Hoeven & Joan van Albada) (stating that archives are, "[b]y their very nature," unique, and
"[Ilost archives are irreplaceable, any loss is final").
16. Id. ("By their very nature archives are unique both as individual documents and as
documents in context.").
17. Id. (noting that the partial loss of an archival record group "devalues [the] legal and
informational worth of the remainder"). Archives are in this way similar to archeological sites, in
which stolen artifacts result not only in the loss of objects, but also in the "historical and scientific
data retrievable from their contexts" being "forever destroyed." Patty Gerstenblith, From
Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of Cultural Heritage at the Beginning of the
21st Century, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 245, 295 (2006).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Stelmokas, 100 F.3d 302, 311-12 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing
the defendant's argument that certain documents' authenticity was questionable because "it is
unclear how [the documents] were moved to the Vilnius archives" by the Germans who seized
them and "because the Germans destroyed many documents demonstrating their criminal
conduct, but 'preserve[d] evidence of Lithuanian misconduct' (alteration in original) (internal
citation omitted)).
19. Id. at 312 (upholding the district court's admission of documents obtained from
Lithuanian archives and certified by archival professionals under the "ancient documents"
exception to hearsay). Under the "ancient documents" exception to the hearsay rule, FED. R.
EVID. 803(16), authentication requires that a document be "in such condition as to create no
suspicion concerning its authenticity" and located "in a place, where it, if authentic, would likely
2010] 1005
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military, legal, and cultural, that attach to records and archives create inherent
dangers of seizure or destruction in war, explain the Post-war reluctance to
return them, and illustrate the imperatives of protection.
1. Intelligence, Military, and Political Value
The potential intelligence, military, and political value of records and
archives has always been a central factor in their fate.21 As archivist Ernst
Posner explained, to the militaries "of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
the archives of the enemy were the arcanum arcanorum that contained
information on his secret policies, his resources, and his administrative
techniques; hence, getting hold of them, especially the archives of the foreign
office, was the urgent desire of the invader. 22 More recently, a 2005 U.S.
Army Civil Affairs guide resurrected the spirit of the World War II MFA&A
units by highlighting the importance of protecting cultural property (including
archives), while also stressing that "[e]nemy archives can have an additional
value" that is "derived from archived information that can be used for
intelligence purposes or can be exploited. 23
Further, the continuing intelligence, military, and political value of seized
records and archives may determine whether, and when, they will ultimately be
returned. For example, almost a decade after World War II, the decision to
return captured German records and archives in United States' custody
depended upon a lengthy declassification process that determined which
records and archives would be returned and which would not.24 Finally, one of
the greatest risks of intentional destruction of records and archives in war
derives from "defending" governments that would rather destroy them than
be." FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8); see Cyrus B. King, The Archivist and "Ancient Documents" as
Evidence, 26 AM. ARCHIVIST 487, 487-89 (1963).
20. See infra Part IL.B-C.
21. See Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Archives in Service to the State, in POLITICAL PRESSURE
AND THE ARCHIVAL RECORD, supra note 4, at 259, 261 (stating that armed forces seize
documents for information on their "opponents (military information); to understand the
organization of the opposing government (political information); to protect the records from
destruction by the opposing state; to deny the opposition the information in the records; and to
obtain documents to make public, thereby exposing the workings of the opposing state").
22. Emst Posner, Public Records Under Military Occupation, 49 AM. HIST. REV. 213, 217
(1944) [hereinafter Posner, Public Records Under Military Occupation]; see Mohammed
Bedjaoui, Eleventh Report on Succession of States in Respect of Matters Other than Treaties -
Draft Articles on Succession in Respect of State Archives, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 67, 75, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/322 ("Espionage is often nothing but a 'paper war' which enables the more
successful to obtain the enemy's-or even the ally's-plans, designs, documents, secret treaties,
and so forth.").
23. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, GTA 41-01-002, CIVIL AFFAIRS ARTS, MONUMENTS, AND
ARCHIVES GUIDE 19 (2005).
24. See Seymour J. Pomrenze, Policies and Procedures for the Protection, Use, and Return
of Captured German Records, in CAPTURED GERMAN AND RELATED RECORDS 5, 28 (Robert
Wolfe ed., 1968).
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risk letting their intelligence fall into the hands of the enemy.25 The traditional
example is the emergency destruction of an embassy's diplomatic archives
when it is being overrun by enemy troops.2 6
2. Legal and Administrative Value
The legal and administrative value of records and archives is another
primary reason they are seized or destroyed in armed conflict. In earlier wars,
for example, conquering powers appropriated archives to support legal title
over the territories they had defeated.2 King Louis XIV took this one step
further by searching the archives of the vanquished for additional land titles to
assert claims on other territories, a process he called "discovering new
countries.' 28  The same values have, at times, made records and archives
targets of destruction as a symbol of a regime's oppressive legal and property
structures, as in the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution when
records of the toppled government were burned with public "rejoicing."2 9
Further, the administrative value of records and archives may make them
necessary for the continued administration of an occupied country. 30 The U.S.
25. See Markko Jarvinen, Convention of The Hague of 1954: Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event ofArmed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON ARCHIVES,
INTERDEPENDENCE OF ARCHIVES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-NINTH, THIRTIETH AND
THIRTY FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE ROUND TABLE ON ARCHIVES 147, 153
(1995) [hereinafter INTERDEPENDENCE OF ARCHIVES] (noting that in war, "especially recent
documents are in danger of destruction by their holders" in order "to avoid their falling into the
hands of the enemy, who usually tries to seize archives and especially recent records, which have
value as information on intentions of the enemy and also as material for war propaganda").
26. See Peterson, supra note 21, at 269 n.17 (noting "a staple of war photography is a
picture of embassy staff, often in the backyard of the embassy, hastily burning records as troops
advance, clearly fearful of seizure"). In principle, the Convention on Consular Relations provides
protection to "consular archives" and diplomatic records "even in [the] case of armed conflict."
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 27(1)(a), opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
27. See Bedjaoui, supra note 22, at 100 (noting that "[u]nder the feudal system, archives
represented a legal title to a right" and therefore, "the victorious side in a war made a point of
removing the archives relating to their acquisitions, taking them from the vanquished enemy by
force if necessary; their right to the lands was guaranteed only by the possession of the
'terriers"'); see also Charles Kecskem6ti, Displaced European Archives: Is It Time for a Post-
War Settlement?, 55 AM. ARCHIVIST 132, 134 (1992) [hereinafter Kecskem6ti, Displaced
European Archives] (noting that "[s]overeigns in Ancien R6gime Europe believed in the value of
records as titles that were instrumental in supporting territorial gains" and thus sought to
"concentrate archives and exploit them").
28. Ernst Posner, Effects of Changes of Sovereignty on Archives, 5 AM. ARCHIVIST 141, 143
(1942) [hereinafter Posner, Effects of Changes].
29. See Michel Duchein, The History of European Archives and the Development of the
Archival Profession in Europe, 55 AM. ARCHIVIST 14, 17-18 (1992).
30. Jarvinen, supra note 25, at 153 (stating that "archive records are indispensable as
information for administrative purposes"); Posner, Public Records Under Military Occupation,
supra note 22, at 219 (noting that, in some circumstances, "public records must become the
continuous source of information for the regime of occupation").
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military underscored this during World War II, noting that "[e]xperience in
other theaters of war has proved the necessity for safeguarding archives, and
this will be particularly true in Germany where the effective imposition of
Milita 7 Government may depend largely upon how successful we are in this
task." On the other hand, those seeking to destabilize an occupation may
attempt to destroy or displace such records. In the Netherlands, for example,
citizens, disguised as police, destroyed "population registers and other records
of the greatest importance" in Amsterdam's Bureau of Vital Statistics in an
effort to undermine the German occupation. 32 Lastly, the role of records and
archives as potential evidence of past human rights abuses or other crimes
creates similar incentives for invading or occupying forces to seize those
records and archives, and for invaded regimes to destroy them.
33
3. Cultural and Historical Value
These political, legal, and administrative attributes help to establish the
cultural and historical value of records and archives, which are arguably one of
the most important forms of cultural property, given that they can be, quite
literally, the primary documents of history. Records and archives are
increasingly seen as an indispensable form of societal "memory," national
patrimony, and state identity. 34 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has similarly described archives as "an
essential part of the heritage of any national community," because they
"document the historical, cultural and economic development of a country and
provide a basis for a national identity."
35
These same qualities, however, can create incentives to shape national
identity by distorting, manipulating, and sanitizing records and archives. That
the birth of modem archives and the birth of modem nationalism were roughly
36
contemporaneous is no coincidence. Not all archives are positive repositories
31. T.J. Davis, Foreword to ALLIED FORCES, SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ADJUTANT-
GEN.'S OFFICE, GENERAL LIST OF ARCHIVES IN WESTERN GERMANY 1, 1 (1945).
32. Posner, Public Records Under Military Occupation, supra note 22, at 222.
33. See, e.g., ITALIAN ARCHIVES DURING THE WAR AND AT ITS CLOSE 18 (Hilary
Jenkinson & H.E. Bell eds., 1947) (noting destruction of archives in Italy as "a result of the
deliberate desire to suppress evidence," including in "the offices of the Republican Ministries,
where the last act of the Fascists was to attempt to cover their tracks").
34. See JEANNETTE ALLIS BASTIAN, OWNING MEMORY: HOW A CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY
LOST ITS ARCHIVES AND FOUND ITS HISTORY 1-2, 5-6 (2003); Erik Ketelaar, Muniments and
Monuments: The Dawn ofArchives as Cultural Patrimony, 7 ARCHIVAL SCI. 343, 343-44 (2007).
35. UNESCO, Consultation Group to Prepare a Report on the Possibility of Transferring
Documents from Archives Constituted Within the Territory of Other Countries, § 4.1, U.N. Doc.
CC.76/WS/9 (Apr. 1, 1976) [hereinafter UNESCO Consultation Group].
36. See Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Archivist, Keynote Address II at the Fifth General
Conference at EASTICA: The Nasty Truth About Nationalism and National Archives (Sept. 19,
2001) in EAST ASIAN ARCHIVES: THE FIFTH GENERAL CONFERENCE OF EASTICA 66, 66 (2002)
(explaining that it is "no accident" that the late "nineteenth century saw the idea of nationalism
dominate political thinking in Europe" and "the founding of the modem national archives and the
1008 [Vol. 59:1001
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of"memory." The early growth of the Nazi movement, for example, "required
not only the mobilization of existing records for political ends but the creation
of new records that would recognize the biological categories the Nazis held to
be so consequential., 37  "There is no racial politics," the head of archival
administration in Bavaria stated in 1936, "without archives, without
archivists." 38 Archives can thus enhance the same nationalistic tendencies that,
in turn, constitute one of the most invidious threats of intentional destruction to
other nations' archives as part of a larger plan of ethnic cleansing, as was
graphically illustrated in the former Yugoslavia.39  Finally, the view of
archives as irreplaceable national identity intensifies debates over their
"repatriation" and complicates the resolution of such disputes. The cultural
and historical nature of archives can thus be both among their most valuable
attributes and the source of their greatest vulnerability to seizure and
destruction.
C. The Challenge of Legal Protection
The central challenge for determining what the legal status of records and
archives is (or should be) in war is that their many differing values are not
mutually exclusive. Both cultural and military value can be found in the same
archival depository, the same record group, and even the same document.
Consequently, the protection of archives in war is always marked with an
asterisk. Armies, as one treatise states, should never seize property such as
"crown jewels, art collections, and archives (except for papers of importance in
connection with the war).' '4°  There are undoubtedly current records of an
exclusively military character that most would accept as legitimate targets of
enemy action; there are also ancient records of an exclusively cultural nature
that most would accept as immune. The area between these two, however, is
vast and difficult to classify or delineate.
archival profession"); Miriam Valencia, Libraries, Nationalism, and Armed Conflict in the
Twentieth Century, 52 LIBRI 1, 3-4 (2002) (discussing how library collections, at times, have
helped build nationalism).
37. Peter Fritzsche, The Archive, 17 HIST. & MEMORY 15, 26 (2005).
38. See Wolfgang Ernst, Archival Action: The Archive as ROM and Its Political
Instrumentalization Under National Socialism, 12 HIST. OF THE HUMAN SC. 13, 26 (1999).
39. See Andras J. Riedlmayer, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace: Destruction of Libraries
During and After the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, 56 LIBR. TRENDS 107, 110-12 (2007). The
intentional destruction of the Bosnian National and University Library, which included "rare
books and manuscripts" and "unique archives" has been called the "largest single incident of
deliberate book-burning in modern history." Id. at 110; see also Soc'y of Am. Archivists,
Resolution on the Systematic Destruction of Archives in Kosovo and War-Caused Devastation of
Archives Throughout Yugoslavia (Apr. 14, 1999), http://www.archivists.org/statements/
kosovoresolution.asp.
40. MoRRis GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 292 (1959) (emphasis
added).
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A distinction between newer records and older archives is a tempting but
often illusory one. Age is not necessarily determinative of cultural or historical
value. "That the Office Papers of to-day are the Archives of to-morrow,"
archivist Hilary Jenkinson noted in 1947, "is a fact still very little reali[z]ed
except by Archivists. '41  Similarly, that archives may be older records of
historical value does not mean they have no significant military value to an
adversary; past experience has shown the value of older records in waging new
42
wars.
Further, any legal distinctions effectively requiring rapid assessments of
individual records are most likely impractical. Troops on the ground often
seize documents in languages they do not speak in urgent and uncertain
circumstances and are therefore unable to appropriately assess the value of
these documents.43  Military authorities, therefore, are likely to advise their
troops, as they did in Allied-controlled Germany, to view all records and
archives as important regardless of their location.44 For all of these reasons,
the uncertain, and sometimes conflicting, values of records and archives are
exceedingly difficult to negotiate legally as well as practically.
Ill. RECORDS AND ARCHIVES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The 1954 Hague Convention, recently ratified by the United States, joins a
short list of binding international instruments relevant to records and archives
in war. 45 This list principally includes the 1907 Hague Convention and its
annexed Regulations on the law of land warfare;46 the Geneva Conventions of
1949 (primarily the Third and Fourth Conventions), which arose in the
aftermath of the widespread destruction and pillage of World War II and were
41. ITALIAN ARCHIVES DURING THE WAR AND AT ITS CLOSE, supra note 33, at 17; see
JAMES M. O'TOOLE & RICHARD J. COX, UNDERSTANDING ARCHIVES & MANUSCRIPTS xii
(2006) (noting that archives can be "valuable records of the very recent past" and that what
"makes these records 'archives' is neither age nor appearance, but rather content, meaning, and
enduring usefulness").
42. See E.G. Campbell, Old Records in a New War, 5 AM. ARCHIVIST 156, 156, 163 (1942)
(describing the use of World War I archives in planning World War II); Anne Bruner Eales, Fort
Archives: The National Archives Goes to War, 35 PROLOGUE 28, 37 (2003) (describing the use of
archived maps and weather data in military planning).
43. See Peterson, supra note 21, at 273 (stating that troops are likely to be "unfamiliar with
basic recordkeeping operations and cannot easily judge what is a record that should be seized for
military needs," and noting "the language problems of soldiers unable to read records they are
encountering").
44. Pomrenze, supra note 24, at 10.
45. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123747.pdf; see also Deposit of Ratification, supra
note 4.
46. See generally Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations].
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designed to ameliorate the effects of war on civilians and combatants; 47 and the
1970 UNESCO Convention, which prohibits the illicit import and export of
cultural property and contains certain provisions related to armed conflict.
48
Added to this list are rules the United States accepts as customary international
law, such as certain provisions of the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions and, prior to U.S. ratification, elements of the 1954 Hague
Convention. 9 Such instruments, however, largely fail to address the unique
characteristics of records and archives, which are left to occupy an uncertain
legal status somewhere between enemy moveable property and cultural
property.
50
In the broadest terms, the law of armed conflict provides that the lawfulness
of destruction or seizure of property in war depends upon the presence of
military necessity, traditionally defined expansively to include actions
"indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as
47. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third 1949 Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 1, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention].
48. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 232 [hereinafter 1970
UNESCO Convention]. The United States implemented the 1970 UNESCO Convention through
the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act. Convention on Cultural Property
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-446, 96 Stat. 2350 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§
2601-2613 (2006)).
49. See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM 2 (2006)
(stating that the laws of war binding on the United States include "treaties and international
agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law");
see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I]. The United States has not ratified Geneva Protocol I,
but accepts those provisions that "reflect customary international law." See Michael J. Matheson,
Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Session One: The United States Position on the
Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, Remarks to the Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law
Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law
and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Jan. 22, 1987), in 2 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 420 (1987). For the U.S. perspective of the 1954 Hague Convention as
customary international law, see Wayne Sandholtz, The Iraqi National Museum and International
Law: A Duty to Protect, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185, 223-37 (2005) and Review of the
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event ofArmed Conflict, supra note 4,
at 103-06.
50. Bess Glenn, Private Records Seized by the United States in Wartime-Their Legal Status,
25 AM. ARCHIVIST 399, 400, 405 (1962) (noting that there "is no question of course, but that
records are property, albeit a special kind of property" and that the multiple characteristics of
records create "a sort of archival platypus"); see Peterson, supra note 21, at 270 ("[A]rchives are
both cultural and administrative property and fit somewhat awkwardly into a purely cultural
definition.").
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possible,"51 and the determination that such property constitutes a "military
objective." 52  For records and archives, these rules have two central and
significant consequences. First, records or archives that have military or
intelligence value are likely "military objectives" and will be subject to seizure
pursuant to military necessity, even if such records may simultaneously have
historical or cultural value. Second, the often-unaddressed effect of capture is
that enemy property lawfully seized during war generally becomes the
property of the capturing state; such property can lawfully constitute "war
booty" or "spoils of war. ''53 The application of such rules, therefore, may be
dispositive of controversies over the legal obligation, if any, to return captured
records or archives following war. At the same time, international practices
and the nature of certain records and archives may entitle them to enhanced
protection as cultural property that may avoid such harsh results.
54
A. Records and Archives as Cultural Property
"Under a former rule of International Law," Oppenheim's International Law
states, "belligerents could appropriate all public and private enemy property
which they found on enemy territory. 55 The status of records and archives
under such a regime was therefore straightforward. If not destroyed through
bombardment, fire, or flood, enemy records and archives were subject to
56seizure. A legal requirement to return them, if any, was created by a peace
treaty that was either negotiated by the parties or, given the unequal bargaining
powers of many post-war belligerents, forced upon the vanquished.
5
Napoleon, for example, famously seized archives from the Vatican, Austria,
and Spain pursuant to such coercion and transported them to Paris as part of an
51. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 3, at 3-4 (1956)
[hereinafter U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL]; see 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
TREATISE: DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY § 150, at 413 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952)
("All destruction of, and damage to, enemy property for the purpose of offen[s]e and defen[s]e is
necessary destruction and damage, and therefore lawful.").
52. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 49, art. 52 (defining military objectives as "those objects
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage").
53. See 50 U.S.C. § 2204(4) (2006) (defining "spoils of war" as "enemy movable property
lawfully captured, seized, confiscated, or found which has become United States property in
accordance with the laws of war"); U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 51, para. 396, at 150
(stating that "[p]ublic property captured or seized from the enemy" is "property of the United
States"); see also infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
54. See TOMAN, supra note 4, at 45.
55. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 51, § 133, at 397 (emphasis added). Oppenheim notes that
this rule "is now obsolete." Id.
56. See Bedjaoui, supra note 22, at 75.
57. See id. (noting that almost all "annexation treaties in Europe since the Middle Ages have
required the conquered to restore the archives belonging to or concerning the ceded territor[ies]").
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"extraordinary archival project. ''58  Upon Napoleon's defeat, the Treaty of
Paris required France to return the archives to the victorious allies.
59
The development of special rules for cultural property during time of war is
generally traced back to General Orders Number 100 of the Union Army, the
so-called Lieber Code, which Francis Lieber drafted in 1863. 60 The Lieber
Code provided special forms of protection to "[c]lassical works of art, libraries,
[and] scientific collections. '61 Although some have suggested that "records
and archives were presumably classed" with libraries in 1863, the coverage
62Lieber intended for such property is unclear. In an earlier work, for example,
Lieber referenced the "[c]arrying off' of archives and works of art in war and
stated that he was unaware of any legal impediment to this action. 63 He noted,
however, that such an action "galls the conquered nation, beyond the time of
war" and that if such property were truly "connected with the history and
feelings of a nation, and were carried off for vain-glorious exhibition, it would
be cruel."
64
In 1874, the nonbinding Brussels Declaration (Declaration), which the
Lieber Code directly influenced, contained special provisions for the protection
of property of "parishes (communes), or establishments devoted to religion,
charity, education, arts and sciences. 65  The Declaration fails to mention
records or archives, which, because the drafters expressly debated including
them in the Declaration, reflects an inability to agree on the status of records
66
and archives and the extent to which they should be protected. In 1880, a
58. Kecskem~ti, Displaced European Archives, supra note 27, at 133-35.
59. Id. at 135; see Bedjaoui, supra note 22, at 100 (discussing the historic practice through
which states that prevailed in war acquired title to conquered states' archives); Mackenzie, supra
note 4, at 244.
60. KIFLE JOTE, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 47 (1994)
(describing the Lieber Code as the "first military handbook in the world to attempt to limit the
conduct of belligerents in relation to cultural heritage"); see Francis Lieber, Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (1898), reprinted in I THE LAW OF WAR:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 158 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972) [hereinafter Lieber Code].
61. Lieber Code, supra note 60, art. 35.
62. Brower, supra note 7, at 194.
63. FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 663 (1838).
64. Id. As to the application of the Lieber Code to records and archives during the Civil
War, it is worth noting that in 1865, as the war was ending, the individual appointed to lead the
"collection, safe-keeping, and publication of the rebel archives" seized by the Union Army from
the Confederacy was none other than Francis Lieber. Adjutant Gen.'s Office, U.S. War Dep't,
Gen. Orders No. 127, in RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR
146 (1983); see Carl L. Lokke, The Captured Confederate Records Under Francis Lieber, 9 AM.
ARCHIVIST 277, 277 (1946).
65. Declaration of Brussels Concerning the Laws and Customs of War Adopted by the
Conference of Brussels, Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in I THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 194 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972) [hereinafter Declaration of Brussels]. The Declaration
arose out of a conference organized by Russia. Id. at 152.
66. See generally id. An Italian delegate suggested adding a reference to public archives
and civil records, to which a Belgian delegate replied that the language already covered such
2010]
Catholic University Law Review
meeting of international law experts produced the influential, but likewise
nonbinding, Oxford Manual, which included a similar provision; however, the
Oxford Manual exressly encompassed "historic monuments, archives, works
of art, or science."
These early developments led directly to the 1907 Hague Regulations
(Regulations) on the law of land warfare, which provide special protection for
"buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes" as well as
"[t]he property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion,
charity and education, the arts and sciences. ' 68 The Regulations adopted much
of this language, with only minor modifications, directly from the 1874
Declaration, which created the same uncertainty regarding whether such
provisions encompass records and archives. Despite this, some commentators
have interpreted the text of the Regulations to cover "at least certain sorts of
archives."
69
The 1954 Hague Convention introduced the phrase "cultural property" and
defined it in expansive terms.7v Although the Convention's inclusion of
archives is express, the parameters of "archives" are uncertain. 71  The
material and an enumerated list would invariably be incomplete. William M. Franklin, Municipal
Property Under Belligerent Occupation, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 383, 390 (1944). The German
delegation also opposed the Italian Delegate's suggestion, arguing that the reference would not
prevent a belligerent "from using such public records as he might need" or from "seiz[ing] all
plans, documents or records of military value." Id. Because the delegates could not reach an
agreement on this point, "the Conference moved on to more fruitful fields for discussion." Id.;
see TOMAN, supra note 4, at 47 (stating that the Brussels Conference "concluded that the
occupying power had the right to seize archives").
67. Inst. of Int'l Law, The Laws of War on Land (Oxford Manual), art. 53 (1880), reprinted
in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 35, 44 (DIETRICH SCHINDLER & Jii TOMAN eds., 1988)
(emphasis added).
68. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 56.
69. O'KEEFE, supra note 4, at 29 (noting that the use of"les sciences" in the official French
version has a broader meaning-encompassing "all manifestations of research and leaming"-
than the English "science" and that the provision would thus cover "at least certain sorts of
archives"); see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
220 (2009) [hereinafter DINSTErN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION] (stating that "property of
municipalities" includes "communal property dedicated to public purposes-such as archives,
public records").
70. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 1; see Stanislaw E. Nahlik, International
Law and the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflicts, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1078
(1976). The 1954 Hague Convention has two protocols; neither the First Protocol, which was
drafted alongside the original Convention in 1954, nor the Second Protocol of 1999, however,
modify the definition of cultural property. Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358 [hereinafter First Protocol to the 1954
Hague Convention]; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 172 [hereinafter
Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention]. The United States signed, but never ratified,
the First Protocol and neither signed nor ratified the Second Protocol.
71. Roger O'Keefe, The Meaning of "Cultural Property" Under the 1954 Hague
Convention, 46 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 26, 27 (1999). Despite the extended definition, there is "a
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Convention defines cultural property as property "of great importance to the
cultural heritage of every people" and includes "manuscripts, books and other
objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific
collections and important collections of books or archives., 72 The definition
also includes buildings that house this type of property, such as "large libraries
and depositaries of archives."
73
Whether specific property constitutes "cultural property" under the 1954
Hague Convention is not, however, simply an objective test. Rather, each
party has the "discretionary competence" to determine whether specific
property within its territory is significant to its national identity and, therefore,
whether the Convention encompasses that property "within the limits imposed
by the ordinary meaning of the words" and the "requirement of good faith.,
74
Periodic reports that parties to the Convention filed with UNESCO give some
flavor to the coverage of archives, especially historical archives, which are
mentioned with some regularity.
75
The 1970 UNESCO Convention, primarily concerned with peacetime trade
restrictions,76 defines cultural property in yet another way, but expressly
includes "archives." 77 Under this definition, cultural property includes "rare
manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and publications of special
seemingly widespread though rarely confessed confusion over the nature and extent of the
cultural property' to which [the 1954 Hague Convention] applies." Id.
72. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 1.
73. Id. An early draft of the Convention used the even broader phrases "documents and
other objects of historical or archeological value" and "collections-of documents or objects-of
scientific value." RECORDS OF THE 1954 HAGUE CONVENTION, supra note 12, at 372. The U.S.
delegate was among those who supported including the term "archives." Id. at 118.
74. O'KEEFE, supra note 4, at 105-06; see TOMAN, supra note 4, at 49 (noting that the
decision to extend protection "depends entirely on the authorities of the country on whose
territory the property is located"); O'Keefe, supra note 71, at 36 ("[Tlhe Convention applies to all
movable and immovable property considered by each respective state to form part of its national
cultural heritage.").
75. See, e.g., UNESCO, Information on the Implementation of the Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in Case of Armed Conflict, the Hague 1945, 26-27, U.N. Doc.
CLT/MD/3 (Dec. 1984) (discussing repositories of French national archives); UNESCO,
Information on the Implementation of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
Case of Armed Conflict, the Hague 1954, 14-18, U.N. Doc. SHC/MD/6 (Apr. 30, 1970)
(discussing archives in Germany and the Netherlands and state archives in Luxembourg). An
attempt to extend "cultural property" or "archives" under the 1954 Hague Convention to more
current records, despite their actual, or potential, historical and cultural importance is
questionable. See Peterson, supra note 21, at 270-71. In 2005, the United Kingdom, considering
possible ratification of the 1954 Hague Convention, proposed that its National Record Offices
should constitute cultural property under the Convention. DEP'T FOR CULTURE, MEDIA AND
SPORT, CULTURAL PROP. UNIT, CONSULTATION PAPER ON: THE 1954 HAGUE CONVENTION ON
THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND ITS Two
PROTOCOLS OF 1954 AND 1999 13 (2005); see O'KEEFE, supra note 4, at 107-08.
76. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 48, art. 1.
77. Id. art. 1(h).
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interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.)" as well as "archives,"
more broadly denoted as including "sound, photographic and cinematographic
archives." 78  A subsequent UNESCO report points to this Convention as
evidence that the "inclusion of archives within the broad definition of culturalS ,,79
property is fully recognized.
The development of these standards illustrates that "archives," whatever the
parameters of that term, are increasingly viewed under international law as a
form of "cultural property." Defining the status of records and archives in
armed conflict, however, is further complicated by the intersection of the
uncertainty of "archives" and "cultural property" with the interminably
ambiguous phrase "military necessity." The current legal regime relevant to
records and archives during times of war is outlined below.
B. The Legal Regime for Records and Archives in War
1. Obligations Prior to Armed Conflict
The responsibility under international law to protect property is triggered
prior to war and is shared by both "defending" and "attacking" forces. With
regard to cultural property, for example, the 1954 Hague Convention requires
parties "to prepare in time of peace for the safeguarding of cultural property
situated within their own territory against the foreseeable effects of an armed
conflict." 80  The 1907 Hague Regulations provide that it is "the duty of the
besieged" to mark specially protected property with "distinctive and visible
signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand. 81 Similarly, the 1954
Hague Convention creates a special Blue Shield emblem (the cultural
equivalent of the Red Cross) that may be affixed to cultural property "so as to
facilitate its recognition."
82
More generally, Geneva Protocol I requires all parties to take reasonable
precautions to protect civilian objects under each respective party's control
from the effects of an attack and, to the extent feasible, make a distinction
between civilian objects and military objectives.83 Defending forces that place
78. Id. art. 1(j).
79. The Director-General, Report of the Director-General on the Study Regarding Problems
Involved in the Transfer of Documents from Archives in the Territory of Certain Countries to the
Country of Their Origin 8, delivered to UNESCO General Conference, U.N. Doc. 20 C/102
(Aug. 25, 1978).
80. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 4.
81. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 27.
82. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, arts. 6, 16. Following the experience of the
MFA&A units during WWII, the 1954 Hague Convention further provides that parties will
undertake to "establish in peace-time, [w]ithin their armed forces, services or specialist
personnel" to assist in protecting cultural property. Id. art. 7(2).
83. See Geneva Protocol 1, supra note 49, art. 58. "Civilian objects" are simply those that
are not "military objectives." Id. art. 52.
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troops or military targets near, for example, a building that houses archives in
anticipation of bombardment share the responsibility for the archives'
subsequent destruction by attacking forces.
84
2. Rights and Responsibilities During Hostilities
The 1907 Hague Regulations provide the basic rule applicable to enemy
property in war: during hostilities, forces are "especially forbidden" to "destroy
or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure [is]
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war."8 5 This formulation presents
the rule as a shield; when reversed, it operates as a sword and military
necessity permits the destruction and seizure of enemy property. A
traditionally expansive understanding of military necessity further enhances
this power.
Separate provisions relate to cultural property. The 1907 Hague
Regulations, for example, state that during "sieges and bombardments all
necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated
to religion, art, science [and] historic monuments" provided that "they are not
being used at the time for military purposes., 86 Article 4(1) of the 1954 Hague
Convention requires parties during hostilities to "respect cultural property
situated within their own territory as well as within the territory" of other
parties by "refraining from any use of the property and its immediate
surroundings ... for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or
damage in the event of armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of
hostility directed against such property. ' 87  Under Article 4(2), however, a
party can waive these obligations when military necessity "imperatively
requires such a waiver." 88 Finally, the Convention requires parties to prohibit
and put a stop to theft, pillage, misappropriation, and vandalism of cultural
property, and to refrain from requisitioning cultural property.89
84. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 4. At the time of Senate ratification, the
United States included its understanding that, as with "all civilian objects, the primary
responsibility for the protection of cultural objects rests with the Party controlling the property, to
ensure that it is properly identified and that it is not used for an unlawful purpose." S. EXEC.
DOC. No. 110-26, at 10 (2008).
85. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 23(g).
86. Id. art. 27.
87. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
88. Id. art. 4(2). Professor Eric Posner has thoughtfully questioned the importance of these
"special" provisions for cultural property because they are not significantly different from the
more general prohibition against the destruction of property in the absence of military necessity.
Eric A. Posner, The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some Skeptical Observations,
8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 213, 226-27 (2007).
89. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
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3. Rights and Responsibilities During Occupation
The presence of records and archives during military occupation implicates
both the responsibilities of occupying powers to protect them and the
corresponding rights of occupying powers to use or seize them. As to the
former, the 1907 Hague Regulations place an affirmative, although general,
duty on an occupying power to "take all measures in his power to restore, and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."9  In addition, the 1954
Hague Convention requires an occupying power to support national authorities
in safeguarding cultural property and, if necessary, to take affirmative steps to
preserve property "damaged by military operations. 91  Under the 1970
UNESCO Convention, parties must undertake to prevent the "illicit" export or
import of cultural property. 92  The Convention provides that the export of
cultural property "under compulsion" arising from an occupation "by a foreign
power shall be regarded as illicit."93 More broadly, the First Protocol to the
1954 Hague Convention seeks to prevent the export of cultural property "from
a territory occupied by it during an armed conflict."
94
Accordingly, the rights and powers of occupying forces to use and seize the
property of the occupied state must be at least as broad as is necessary to
accomplish the considerable tasks of restoring public order and safety and
administering a territory under occupation. Regarding the seizure of property,
the 1907 Hague Regulations provide that an "army of occupation" can take
possession of "all movable property belonging to the State which may be used
for military operations." 95 The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an
occupying power from destroying public or private property, "except where
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations."
96
The right to seize records and archives during occupation thus depends on
several factors. First, Article 53 of the 1907 Hague Regulations excludes
public records and archives not susceptible to military use from seizure.
97
90. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 43.
91. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 5. Further, if local authorities are unable to
take such steps, the occupying power shall "take the most necessary measures of preservation."
Id.
92. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 48, art. 2.
93. Id. art. 11.
94. First Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 70, at 358. The United States
has signed, but not ratified, the First Protocol. See generally id.
95. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 53.
96. Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention, supra note 47, art. 53.
97. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 53. With respect to the breadth of this
exclusion, the Army Field Manual notes that "[ulnder modem conditions of warfare, a large
proportion of State property may be regarded as capable of being used for military purposes."
U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 51, para. 404, at 151-52. Other military guidance
concurs that property not susceptible to military use is "a very limited class," but includes in this
class "court, property banking and other valuable records" as well as "cultural property" as it has
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Second, Article 56 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides that, during
occupation
[t]he property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, even when
State property, shall be treated as private property. All seizure of,
destruction or willful damage done to institutions of this character,
historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and
should be made the subject of legal proceedings. 98
The extent to which the drafters intended this provision to encompass records
or archives is unclear from the text of the original draft. 99
Further, the application of this provision to records and archives related to
war or of military value creates two possible scenarios under the Regulations.
First, Article 56 could exclude certain records and archives from its protections
altogether. Interpreting this article, Oppenheim's International Law states that
archives "are no doubt of scientific value, but a belligerent may nevertheless
seize such State papers deposited therein as are of importance to him in
connection with the war." Second, in contrast, if Article 56 applies and
records are treated as private property, the 1907 Hague Regulations separately
provide that "private property cannot be confiscated." However, the
occupying power may still utilize certain property susceptible to military use
"even if [it] belong[s] to private individuals." 102 Although both of these paths
come to the same initial result-namely, an occupying power may take
"no possible military use" and, therefore, there is "no reason to confiscate or seize it." DEP'T OF
THE ARMY, supra note 23, at 18 fig.4.
98. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 56.
99. See id. The provision was derived from similar language in the 1874 Brussels
Declaration. See Franklin, supra note 66, at 385; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
100. OPPENHEIM, supra note 51, § 138. Likewise, a 1949 U.S. government report concluded
that German records seized in World War II were not protected under Article 56 of the 1907
Hague Regulations. ERNST POSNER, REPORT ON THE PUBLIC ARCHIVES OF GERMANY 51-52
(1949) (on file with author).
101. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 46.
102. Id. art. 53. The U.S. Army Field Manual specifically lists "documents connected with
the war" as "private property susceptible of direct military use." U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL,
supra note 51, para. 410, at 153. On the status of private foreign records seized within the United
States during war, see generally Glenn, supra note 50. Similarly, under both the 1907 Hague
Regulations and the Third 1949 Geneva Convention, personal possessions generally remain the
property of a prisoner of war, with an exception for "military documents." 1907 Hague
Regulations, supra note 46, art. 4 (stating that all "personable belongings" of prisoners of war
remain their property "except arms, horses, and military papers"); Third 1949 Geneva
Convention, supra note 47, art. 18 ("All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses,
military equipment and military documents, shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war.").
The International Committee of the Red Cross interprets "military documents" to include "maps,
regulations, written orders, plans, individual military records, etc." Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross,
Commentary on Article 18 of Geneva Convention II Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, para. I n.4, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590023?Open
Document.
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custody of records or archives of military value-the legal effect of such
seizures and the long-term status of such property varies greatly.
4. Wartime Capture and Post- War Obligations of Return
The obligation under international law of a belligerent to return records and
archives seized during times of war depends primarily upon the circumstances
of capture. Under the law of armed conflict, public moveable property
lawfully seized during hostilities pursuant to military necessity generally
becomes the property of the capturing state; in other words, it becomes war
booty. 10 3 Likewise, during occupation, an enemy's seized public moveable
property susceptible to military use and necessary for military operations also
becomes the property of the seizing state. 104 The U.S. Army Field Manual
summarizes: "[p]ublic property captured or seized from the enemy, as well as
private property validly captured on the battlefield and abandoned property, is
the property of the United States."'1 5  The operation of these rules may
therefore preclude any legal obligation to return seized records and archives.
The status of records and archives as cultural property, however, may alter
this result. First, to the extent that Article 56 of the 1907 Hague Regulations
requires parties to treat certain records or archives as private property (either as
"municipal" property or property devoted to "arts and sciences"), their seizure
and use does not convert them into the property of the occupying power;
instead they "must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is
made."' 6 Second, the 1954 Hague Convention requires that parties prevent or
103. GREENSPAN, supra note 40, at 281-82 (noting that "[a]ll booty of war becomes the
property of the government of the captors"); see I JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE
DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 173 (2005) [hereinafter
ICRC STUDY] (discussing the status of "military equipment belonging to an adverse party as war
booty" under customary international humanitarian law).
104. See DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 69, at 219 ("When an Occupying
Power takes possession of State movables-in conformity with Hague Regulation 53 . . .- it
acquires title in them."); GREENSPAN, supra note 40, at 290-91 (noting that an "occupant may
take absolute possession" of "all movable property belonging to the enemy state which may be
used for military operations" as "booty of war"); OPPENHEIM, supra note 51, § 137 (noting that
under Article 53 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, "[m]ovable public enemy property may
certainly be appropriated by a belligerent, provided that it can directly or indirectly be useful for
military operations").
105. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 51, at 150. The definition of abandoned
property is broader during war time than it is in times of peace; this broader definition includes
"property that was left behind or cast aside in situations where the right to possession was not
voluntarily surrendered." Morrison v. United States, 492 F.2d 1219, 1226-27 (Ct. Cl. 1974)
(finding that U.S. ownership over seized enemy currency found in Vietnam during the war was
abandoned property and, thus, "public property" under the laws of war).
106. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 53. This is consistent with the debate
among the drafters of the 1874 Brussels Declaration, the document on which Article 56 of the
1907 Hague Regulations is based. Franklin, supra note 66, at 390. Although arguing that such a
provision could not prevent an occupant from using records or archives of military value, the
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stop "misappropriation" of cultural property and that parties "refrain from
requisitioning moveable cultural property."' 0 7  Finally, the Convention
provides "[i]mmunity from seizure, capture and prize" for cultural property
being transported subject to special conditions.10 8
The analysis of the international archival community, represented most
prominently by the International Council on Archives (ICA), is also relevant.
Based on a review of historical peace treaties that date back to the 1600s, the
ICA identifies an international practice "progressively established from the
time of the Treaty of Westphalia onwards" and "implicitly respected" that
"archives captured and displaced during hostilities were returned once peace
was concluded."' 0 9 The ICA links this practice to the "inalienability" of public
archives under national laws.' 10 Archivist Charles Kecskemrti describes this
view as follows:
No matter what vicissitudes they have gone through, public
archives remain inalienable other than by an enactment of a
legislative body, or by decision of equal legal value, of the state
which had created them. The right of property in public archives
does not fluctuate in accordance with events. It follows that any
decision to appropriate archives, seized during military campaigns or
times of occupation, taken by the state holding them, has, in fact, no
legal value.
German delegation stated that the occupant could seize the records and archives "provided, of
course, that he gave a receipt for same." Id.
107. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(3).
108. See id. art. 14. Jifi Toman interprets "capture" as used in this provision of the Hague
Convention "as a synonym for the right to booty" that "results in the acquiring of ownership with
no obligation in regard to restitution or compensation." TOMAN, supra note 4, at 170. This
protection only applies during the movement of cultural property if certain requirements are
satisfied and is further qualified because the Article cannot be read to "limit the right of visit and
search." 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 14. Toman notes the possibility that "the
resistance or intelligence agents" could "transmit information of vital importance from the
military standpoint" led to "the additional sentence regarding the right of the opposing Party to
visit and search ... in order to ensure there were no military intelligence leaks." TOMAN, supra
note 4, at 171.
109. See Int'l Council on Archives [ICA], "The View of the Archival Community on the
Settling of Disputed Claims": Position Paper Adopted by the Executive Committee of the
International Council on Archives at Its Meeting in Guangzhou, para. 1 (1995), reprinted in
PATRICIA KENNEDY GRIMSTED, TROPHIES OF WAR AND EMPIRE app. VII, at 558 (2001)
[hereinafter ICA Position Paper]. For a list of the historical treaties and a description of their
relevant provisions, see generally U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Non-Exhaustive Table of Treaties
Containing Provisions Relating to the Transfer of Archives in Cases of Succession of States,
reprinted in GRIMSTED, supra, at app. II [hereinafter Non-Exhaustive Table of Treaties].
110. See ICA Position Paper, supra note 109, para. 4 ("National laws agree in conferring the
status of inalienable and imprescriptible public property on public records.").
111. Charles Kecskemrti, Activities of UNESCO and ICA Since 1976: Part Two, in
INTERDEPENDENCE OF ARCHIVES, supra note 25, at 79, 84 [hereinafter Kecskemdti, Activities of
UNESCO and ICA Since 1976]; see UNESCO Consultation Group, supra note 35, para. 6.1.1
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Whether the principle of "inalienability" of public archives represents a
custom binding under international law during armed conflict is, however,
questionable. Although national laws may treat state records and archives as
inalienable state property, this treatment does not trump the operation of the
law of armed conflict under which belligerents may permanently appropriate
public property pursuant to military necessity. 112 Moreover, according to the
ICA, since 1945 the international community has largely abandoned the
practice of returning seized archives following war pursuant to negotiated
peace treaties.' 13 Further, the historical treaties requiring the return of archives
on which the principle of archival inalienability relies, which were neither
uniform nor unanimous, 114 may also reflect unequal negotiating positions and
victors imposing terms on defeated foes. 115 Although the eventual return of
records and archives seized during war may be a common international
practice, the primary basis for such transfers would more often appear to be
diplomatic policy and discretion rather than a binding custom of international
law.
Similarly, the United States has generally followed a practice of returning
originals of records and archives that it seized during war or occupation,
usually after making microfilm copies. 116 Such transfers have often occurred,
("Military and colonial occupation should grant no particular right to retain records acquired by
virtue of such occupation."). Thus, unlike provisions such as Article 56 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations, that seek to protect certain forms of public property by requiring that they be treated
as private property, this view proffers that it is precisely the public nature of state archives that
should render them "inalienable." See Mackenzie, supra note 4, at 246 (noting that protecting
cultural property by treating it as private property "create[s] a distinction that would not fit
comfortably" with "the modem concept of inalienability of public records displaced by war").
112. Kecskemdti acknowledges the right of belligerents in "the exploitation of 'captured'
archives for military, political, scientific or administrative objectives," but argues that the
"capture of archives in the course of war" gives the "new holder" no rights beyond that.
Kecskemtti, Activities of UNESCO and ICA Since 1976, supra note 111, at 84.
113. ICA Position Paper, supra note 109, para. 2.
114. See Non-Exhaustive Table of Treaties, supra note 109, at 511-30. Many of the
historical peace treaties required the return of removed archives, some did not, and still others
distinguished between historical archives and administrative ones. See generally id.; see also
Kecskemtti, Displaced European Archives, supra note 27, at 132 ("The Monster peace treaty of
1648 prescribed neither the transfer nor the restitution of records. It simply legalized the archival
situation as it was shaped by the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).").
115. See, e.g., Bedjaoui, supra note 22, at 75 (noting that such treaties "required the
conquered to restore the archives belonging to or concerning the ceded territory" (emphasis
added)); Posner, Effects of Changes, supra note 28, at 152 (explaining that, in one negotiation,
"Austria's bargaining position was extremely weak," and thus "she had to sacrifice archives,
without which people can live, to get bread and other food, without which they cannot live").
116. Brower, supra note 7, at 202 (describing the history of U.S. seizures and the disposition
of foreign records prior to World War I, including the practice of "selective microfilming"); see
Geraldine N. Phillips, Duplication Before Restitution: Costs and Benefits-the U.S. Experience, in
INTERDEPENDENCE OF ARCHIVES, supra note 25, at 167, 168 (discussing the microfiche
reproduction of documents that the United States seized from Grenada in 1983).
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however, many years after the relevant war has ended, when the intelligence
value of the records' content has been exhausted and the security and
diplomatic advantage of withholding them has passed.' 17 Further, the United
States has often made clear that such transfers were voluntary and not legally
compelled. In 1953, for example, German records seized during World War II
were "donated" to Germany based on the determination that legal title to the
records had passed to the United States.'1 In fact, the United States treated the
captured German records as U.S. federal records and obtained congressional
approval for their "donation" to Germany pursuant to the Records Disposal Act
of 1943.' 9 Such approval was obtained based on the fiction, asserted by the
Archivist of the United States, that the records did not have "sufficient
During the 20th century the United States seized records during four conflicts:
World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Grenada. In all of these previous instances, U.S.
practice has been to repatriate the records after their primary utility was exhausted and
after copies were made for historical purposes and broad public access.
Soc'y of Am. Archivists & Ass'n of Canadian Archivists, supra note 1; see Peterson, supra note
21, at 262-64 (describing U.S. seizures of foreign records).
117. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Media Note, Return of Smolensk Archive (Dec. 13, 2002),
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2002/December/2002121316245 ljthomas@pd.state.
govO. 101101 l.html (explaining that a particularly controversial set of archives the Germans
seized from Smolensk, Russia, in World War II that "came into the possession of U.S. Forces at
the end of the war" was used as a source of intelligence during the Cold War and was later
returned to Russia in late 2002); see also PATRICIA KENNEDY GRIMSTED, THE ODYSSEY OF THE
SMOLENSK ARCHIVE: PLUNDERED COMMUNIST RECORDS FOR THE SERVICE OF ANTI-
COMMUNISM (1995) [hereinafter GRIMSTED, ODYSSEY]. Records captured by U.S. forces in
Grenada in 1983 as the New Jewel Movement was controlling the country were returned
comparatively quickly in 1984 at the request of the new government. See Phillips, supra note
116, at 168.
118. U.S. NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., GENERAL RECORDS SCHEDULE, SEIZED
GERMAN RECORDS, JOB NO. 11-NNA-777 (Aug. 1, 1953), U.S. National Archives, Record Group
242, AGAR-S No. 3144 (on file with author) [hereinafter U.S. ARCHIVES, SEIZED GERMAN
RECORDS]; cf Act of July 3, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-81, § 1, 71 Stat. 276, 276 (1957) (authorizing
the Administrator of General Services to "donate" to the Philippines "the records captured by
United States forces from the Philippine insurgents during the period 1899-1903"); Brower, supra
note 7, at 202 (discussing the transfer of records to the Philippines).
119. See Act of July 7, 1943, ch. 192, 57 Stat. 380 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§
3301-3324 (2006)). Under current U.S. statutes and regulations governing federal records, the
question of whether seized foreign records become U.S. records is not answered with any clarity.
"Records" is defined to include documents that have been "received" by a federal agency. 44
U.S.C. § 3301 (2006). National Archives and Records Administration regulations purport to
clarify the term "received" by stating that it "may or may not refer to . . . seized materials
depending on the conditions under which such materials came into agency custody or were used
by the agency" and advise simply that "legal counsel should be sought regarding the 'record'
status of... seized materials." 36 C.F.R. § 1222.10(b)(4) (2010). Concluding that seized foreign
records have not become U.S. federal records, however, is not necessarily dispositive of the
related, but separate, question of whether title to seized records has passed to the United States.
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administrative, legal, research, or other value to warrant their further
preservation by the United States Government."'
' 20
U.S. policy has not, however, been clear or consistent. 12  A year earlier in
1952, for example, the U.S. government internally debated whether title to
certain records seized during the occupation of Japan had passed to the United
States, or whether, under international law, seizure of the records gave the
United States only "the right to custody and use."'122 Ultimately, in 1956, the
United States approved the return of a significant number of Japanese records
pursuant to congressional authority on the same basis as the German
records. 123
The National Archives and Records Administration notes that, since World
War II, determining the "legal status" of foreign records obtained during armed
conflict has remained an "evolving process."' 24 The U.S. government was
apparently divided, for example, over whether title to records seized in Haiti in
1994 had passed to the United States.125 The Department of Defense (DoD)
reportedly insisted that the documents "became American property when
United States troops seized them," although Representative John Conyers
claimed to have obtained an opinion from the American Law Division of the
Congressional Research Service concluding that the documents remained the
property of Haiti. 126 While a thorough examination of U.S. practice has yet to
120. U.S. ARCHIVES, SEIZED GERMAN RECORDS, supra note 118; Pomrenze, supra note 24,
at 28.
121. Glenn, supra note 50, at 400, 405 (stating that U.S. policies on records seized in war
"has followed a meandering course" and has generally "followed a policy of self-interest, of
expediency, rather than a consistent principle of law" and has made only a "feeble and
inconclusive effort to achieve a solution of the question as to the legal status of the seized
records").
122. Greg Bradsher, A "Constantly Recurring Irritant": Returning Captured and Seized
Japanese Records, 1946-1961, in NAZI WAR CRIMES AND JAPANESE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT
RECORDS INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP, RESEARCHING JAPANESE WAR CRIMES:
INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS 169, 175 (2006).
123. U.S. NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., GENERAL RECORDS SCHEDULE, SEIZED
JAPANESE RECORDS, JOB No. ll-NNA-2082 (Mar. 23, 1956), U.S. National Archives, Record
Group 242, AGAR-S No. 3145 (on file with author) [hereinafter U.S. ARCHIVES SEIZED
JAPANESE RECORDS]; see U.S. ARCHIVES, SEIZED GERMAN RECORDS, supra note 118 (laying
out the basis for returning German records); see also Bradsher, supra note 122, at 179-80;
Pomrenze, supra note 24, at 28-30.
124. See generally Letter from John W. Carlin, Archivist of the U.S., to Donald H. Rumsfeld,
U.S. Sec'y of Def. (Apr. 17, 2003) (on file with author).
125. Larry Rohter, Haiti Accuses U.S. of Holding Data Recovered by G.I. 's, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1995, at Al.
126. Id; 142 CONG. REC. 12,514 n.1 (1996) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (stating that the
American Law Division "determined that according to the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States and international law as interpreted by the United States, the seized documents clearly
belong to the legitimate government of Haiti" and that the "opinion also noted that their seizure
and retention is a departure from these norms"). A written request by the author to the office of
Rep. Conyers for a copy of this opinion was not answered.
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be written, 12 7 diplomacy, more often than law, appears to drive the ultimatedisposition of captured foreign records in U.S. custody.' 28
IV. BA'ATH PARTY DOCUMENTS IN THE IRAQ WAR
The unique characteristics of records and archives and the limitations of
international law in defining their status are plainly illustrated by the ongoing
controversies over the fate of Ba'ath party records in the Second Gulf War.
Ba'ath party documents represent all of the conflicting values of records and
archives. As U.S. and coalition forces entered Iraq on March 20, 2003, the
records of the Ba'ath party, which ruled the enemy government and military,
had significant military and intelligence value. To Iraqis, such records
presented the possibility of obtaining information on the fate of missing
relatives or proof of legal rights for those whose property deeds and
identification documents had been confiscated or destroyed by Ba'ath party
officials. 130 Such records also potentially constituted evidence that the regime
committed human rights abuses and, if preserved as archives, would be part of
"modem Iraq's historical memory."'1 31
Unsurprisingly, the fate of Ba'ath party records quickly became
controversial. In early April 2003, Human Rights Watch complained that
"U.S. and coalition forces [had] done little to stop" the looting of government
offices and Ba'ath party records that occurred "in many Iraqi cities as the
government collapse[d].' 3 2  The Society of American Archivists similarly
expressed concern over reports of destruction and looting of "contemporary
and historical records" and acknowledged their value, stating that "[w]ithout
records, Iraqi officials cannot be held accountable. Without records, citizens
cannot exercise their rights. Without records, a stable economic environment
127. For the period prior to World War I, see generally Brower, supra note 7.
128. See U.S. ARCHIVES, SEIZED GERMAN RECORDS, supra note 118. With regard to
captured German records, the "stated policy of the Department of State" was that, "in order to
promote friendly relations with the Federal Republic of Germany on a normal basis, bring about
effective participation by the Federal Republic in the European Defense Community on a basis of
equality, and remove unnecessary obstacle to the attainment of these objectives, the seized
German documents should be returned to the Federal Republic." Id Similarly, records captured
in Grenada in 1983 were returned to the new government based on "diplomatic need." See
Phillips, supra note 116, at 168.
129. See The Iraqi Documents: A Glimpse into the Regime of Sadaam Hussein: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on International
Relations, 109th Cong. 34 (2006) (statement of Daniel Butler, Senior Advisor to the Assistant
Deputy Director of National Intelligence of Open Source, Open Source Center, Office of Director
of National Intelligence) [hereinafter Iraqi Documents] (describing the intelligence vetting
procedure for the Iraqi documents).
130. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IRAQ: STATE OF THE EVIDENCE 8 (2004).
131. Saad Eskander, The Tale of Iraq's "Cemetery of Books," INFORMATION TODAY, Dec.
2004, 1, 50 [hereinafter Eskander, Cemetery of Books].
132. Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Protect Government Archives from Looting (Apr. 9, 2003),
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/04/09/iraq-protect-govemment-archives-looting.
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cannot emerge. And without records, the Iraqi people as well as the citizens of
the world lose an important part of our shared cultural heritage."'
133
Similar sentiments were raised within the government by the National
Archives and Records Administration, which offered its assistance to the DoD
"in dealing with the documents that Coalition forces [were] securing from the
Iraqi Government," noting that "these documents [would] be essential in
rebuilding and maintaining the country's infrastructure, protecting property
rights, and providing evidence in judicial proceedings. ' 34
On April 16, 2003, General Tommy Franks, Commander of Coalition
Forces, in a document entitled "Freedom to the Iraqi People," proclaimed that
the Ba'ath party "is hereby disestablished," that "[p]roperty of the Ba'ath party
should be turned over [sic] the Coalition Provisional Authority," and that
"Saddam Hussein's intelligence and security apparatus" is "hereby deprived of
all powers and authority."' 135 General Franks specifically called upon Iraqis "to
inform Coalition Forces regarding the location of: foreign fighters and
terrorists; members of the regime's security apparatus; and individuals who
have perpetrated crimes against humanity or war crimes. All records
concerning these activities should be preserved."136  On May 25, 2003,
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 4 announced that all
"property and assets," expressly defined to include "records and data," of the
Ba'ath party were "subject to seizure by the CPA," an order that remained in
effect until the CPA transferred sovereignty to the new Iraqi government on
June 28, 2004.137
During this period, the fate of three separate groups of Ba'ath party records
and archives created controversies that continue to the present. One group was
housed in the Iraqi National Library and Archives in Baghdad, and many of the
documents were destroyed in early April 2003 when the building was burned
and looted. 138 As with the highly publicized looting of the Iraqi National
Museum, many authorities have alleged that international law required the
133. Soc'y of Am. Archivists, Statement on Iraqi Archives (Apr. 2003), http://www.
archivists.org/statements/iraqi archives.asp.
134. Letter from John W. Carlin to Donald H. Rumsfeld, supra note 124.
135. Gen. Tommy R. Franks, Freedom to the Iraqi People, in L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., THE LIBRARY OF CONG., THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA):
ORIGIN, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES app. at 47 (2006).
136. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
137. Coal. Provisional Auth. [CPA], Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 4:
Management of Property and Assets of the Iraqi Baath Party, §§ 1, 4 CPA Doc. CPA/ORD/25
May 2004/04 (May 25, 2003) [hereinafter CPA Order No. 4]; CPA, CPA Order Number 100:
Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued by the Coalition Provisional
Authority, § 4(1), CPA Doc. CPA/ORD/29 June 2004/100 (June 28, 2004) [hereinafter CPA
Order No. 100] (rescinding CPA Order No. 4).
138. Nabil Al-Tikriti, "Stuff Happens": A Brief Overview of the 2003 Destruction of lraqi
Manuscript Colletions, Archives, and Libraries, 55 LIBRARY TRENDS 730, 732-33 (2007).
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United States and coalition forces to prevent the destruction of these
archives.
1 39
Controversies also surround two different sets of Ba'ath party records that
were seized and removed from Iraq. These include Ba'ath party records U.S.
personnel seized throughout Iraq during and after the war that were transferred
out of Iraq to an undisclosed location and used for U.S. intelligence
purposes.140  A U.S. non-governmental organization, the Iraq Memory
Foundation, removed others from Ba'ath party headquarters in Baghdad and
ultimately transported them to the United States where they are currently on
deposit at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. 141 Each of these
controversies, discussed in detail below, illustrates the complexity and
inadequacy of international law in addressing the status of records and archives
in war.
A. The Fall of Baghdad and the Iraqi National Archives
When the war began in 2003, the Iraqi National Library and Archives in
Baghdad contained an extensive archival collection that included Ottoman
government documents, files from the British Occupation, as well as certain
Ba'ath party records. 142 Leading up to the war, the librarians and archivists
undertook preventative actions, including the evacuation of the Ottoman
records to the basement of the Board of Tourism located elsewhere in the
city.1 43 The current Director General of the National Archives, Saad Eskander,
states that one motivation for this relocation was the proximity of the National
Archives to the Ministry of Defense, which "was clearly a military target, if
war broke out. ' 14 4 On April 10, 2003, the day after Saddam Hussein's statue
was famously pulled down as Baghdad fell, U.S. forces reportedly entered the
139. See id. at 731-32 (stating that "primary liability appears to lie with occupation forces"
and "those in command of U.S. forces may have knowingly neglected their legal duty under
international humanitarian law"); Eskander, Cemetery of Books, supra note 131 ("It is true that
the Americans, as occupiers and according to international laws, neglected their duties to
safeguard Iraq's cultural heritage and must accept responsibility for what happened.").
140. Editorial, Iraq's Archives, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2004, at A20.
141. Adam Gorlick, Saddam Hussein's Papers, Along with Controversy, Find a Temporary
Home with the Hoover Institution, STAN. UNIV. NEWS, June 18, 2008, available at http://news-
service.stanford.edu/news/2008/june I 8/iraq-061 808.html.
142. A1-Tikriti, supra note 138, at 733; Saad Eskander, Records and Archives Recovery in
Iraq: Past, Present and Future, IRAQI NAT'L LIBRARY & ARCHIVES, July 17, 2006,
http://www.iraqnla.org/fp/artlartl.htm [hereinafter Eskander, Records and Archives Recovery in
Iraq].
143. See AI-Tikriti, supra note 138, at 733. The basement of the Board of Tourism later
flooded, causing significant damage to the archives stored there. See id. Although suffering from
inadequate funds and neglect, a preservation program attempted to reproduce historical
documents on microfilm and microfiche and establish an emergency plan to protect the
collections "under war conditions." See Eskander, Records and Archives Recovery in Iraq, supra
note 142.
144. Eskander, Records andArchives Recovery in Iraq, supra note 142.
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grounds of the National Library and Archives building in Iraq, where they tore
down another statue of Saddam Hussein located near the entrance.
145
Following this, looting and destruction began.
146
The events at the Iraqi National Library and Archives, however, were more
complex than random looting and destruction. A delegation from the U.S.
Library of Congress that visited in late 2003 to assess the damage learned of
two fires, the first on April 10 and the second on April 14, 2003, affecting
certain archives, but not others. 14 7  The delegation reported that "[a]fter
questioning the librarians repeatedly, it became clear that the archives that
were burnt were those that covered ... the Republican era, which according to
them included the archives from 1977 to the present."' 48  The delegation
further noted that "some kind of highly incendiary device had been used that
would not likely have been found in the hands of random looters.' 4 9
Additionally, Eskander has described the destroyed records as encompassing
"the history of the Ba'ath Party since it seized power in 1963" and
"contain[ing] the transcripts of all court-martials set up by the Ba'ath regime
for the trial of its opponents."' 50  Eskander agrees that the destruction was
"well-organized" and believes that Ba'athists "loyal to the old regime" were
responsible.
151
The destruction at the National Archives has been considered alongside the
more highly publicized, and roughly simultaneous, looting of the Iraqi
National Museum, and the analysis has focused primarily upon whether
international law required the United States to prevent such destruction on two
primary bases.' 52 The first is Article 4(3) of the 1954 Hague Convention,
which requires parties to "undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put
a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of
145. Eskander, Cemetary of Books, supra note 131, at 50.
146. Id.
147. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE MISSION TO
BAGHDAD: REPORT ON THE NATIONAL LIBRARY AND THE HOUSE OF MANUSCRIPTS (2003),
http://www.loc.gov/rr/amed/iraqreport/iraqreport.html [hereinafter MISSION TO BAGHDAD
REPORT]. The current Director General has indicated his belief that the second fire occurred on
April 12, not April 14. Eskander, Cemetery of Books, supra note 131.
148. MISSION TO BAGHDAD REPORT, supra note 147 ("Other archives, such as those...
from the Ministry of Interior ... covering the period 1920 to 1977, lay unharmed in rice bags in
rooms close to those in which the republican archives had been burnt to ashes.").
149. Id. A small portion of the targeted archives were preserved through timely evacuation
by local clerics who "haphazardly" collected some of these archival documents and stored them
for safekeeping. Id.
150. Eskander, Cemetary of Books, supra note 13 1, at 5 1.
151. Id.
152. See Al-Tikriti, supra note 138, at 731-32; Gerstenblith, supra note 17, at 308-09
(discussing the looting and vandalism of the Iraq Museum "and other cultural institutions, such as
archives and libraries").
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vandalism directed against, cultural property." 153 Previous debate has centered
on whether this provision represented customary international law, and was
therefore binding on the United States at the time, and the unresolved issue of
whether this provision is limited to requiring a nation to control the actions of
its own forces, or whether the obligation extends to preventing the acts of local
enemy civilians such as those that looted the Iraqi National Museum. 154 The
second basis is the 1907 Hague Regulations, which places affirmative duties
on an occupant to "take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as
far as possible, public order and safety." 155 This specific provision implicates
the often debated, and perhaps irresolvable, question of when the occupation of
Baghdad began, a date usually placed somewhere between April 9, 2003, when
"[t]he regime in Baghdad effectively ceased to function,"'156 and May 22, 2003,
when United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 formally recognized
the United States and the United Kingdom "as occupying powers under unified
command." 157  Although these contentious issues are also relevant to the
events surrounding the Ba'ath party records stored at the National Archives,
the nature of these records and the apparent identity and possible authority of
153. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(3). As discussed earlier, although the
United States was not yet a party to the 1954 Hague Convention, it had signed and accepted at
least certain provisions as customary international law. See Review of the Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, supra note 4, at 103-06;
Sandholtz, supra note 49, at 223-40.
154. Compare O'KEEFE, supra note 4, at 133 (stating that article 4(3) "is not limited to the
commission of such acts by a Party's own armed forces but extends to commission by the local
populace"), and Yoram Dinstein, Jus in Bello Issues Arising in the Hostilities in Iraq in 2003, in
80 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS
43, 50 (Richard B. Jacques ed., 2006) (stating that "[s]urely, [Article 4(3)] covers all types of
looting, including that carried out by local inhabitants against their own Government, institutions
and co-nationals"), with Gerstenblith, supra note 17, at 310 (concluding that Article 4(3) of the
1954 Hague Convention is "intended to require nations to restrain only their own military forces
from engaging in acts of vandalism, looting, and pillage directed against the territory of an
opposing nation").
155. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 43.
156. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, THE IRAQ WAR: STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND MILITARY
LESSONS 112 (2003). Further, on April 9, 2003, Iraq's Ambassador to the United Nations stated
that "the government of Iraq had been defeated." Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law: Use of Military Force to Disarm Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 427
(Stephen D. Murphy ed., 2003).
157. S.C. Res. 1483, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); see Gregory H. Fox, The
Occupation ofIraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 201-02 (2005) (examining the timeline between the
U.S. and Britain's initial entry and the U.N Security Council's recognition of their occupation);
Gerstenblith, supra note 17, at 309 n.289 ("Although the United States should be regarded as the
occupier of Iraq after May 22, 2003, most of the looting of cultural institutions took place during
April in a period of active hostilities rather than occupation."); John C. Johnson, Under New
Management: The Obligation to Protect Cultural Property During Military Occupation, 190 MIL.
L. REv. 111, 149 (2006-2007) ("It is probably impossible to determine at what point, if any, the
United States occupied Bagdad, or at least the vicinity of the Iraqi National Museum, between 9
and 16 April 2003.").
2010] 1029
Catholic University Law Review
those who destroyed them present a far more complex and ambiguous factual
and legal situation than the looting at the National Museum; they also alter the
application of international law.
1. Iraqi National Archives as Cultural Property
Unlike the looted art and archeological collections of the Iraqi National
Museum, it is unclear whether Ba'ath party records in the Iraqi National
Archives constitute protected cultural property. Under the 1954 Hague
Convention, the Iraqi National Archives would likely fall within the "large
libraries and depositaries of archives" language of Article 1(b); 1 ' its primary
contents also would appear to constitute "important collections of books or
archives" under Article l(a). 159 Additionally, that these records were in the
National Archives suggests their importance and lasting historical value, as
well as the intent to treat and preserve them as cultural property. Ba'ath party
records, however, present a concrete example of the difficulty of treating
records that may be politically valuable as cultural property. As their apparent
intentional destruction suggests, these records were not solely of historical
value, but also may have possessed political and intelligence value.1 60 Current
Director General Eskander notes this dual nature of the destroyed Ba'ath party
archives by describing them as being "of great value politically as well as
historically."
'1 61
In essence, all national archives present a similar problem. Their purpose is
to house, in the words of the 1954 Hague Convention, material "of great
importance to the cultural heritage" of the nation,162 and there may likewise be
buildings devoted to "arts and sciences" under the 1907 Hague Regulations;
63
yet the archives are not always neutral. Archivist Ernst Posner describes, for
example, that the director of the Belgian State Archives at Antwerp bravely,
but unsuccessfully, attempted to protect the Belgian archives by "point[ing] out
to requisitioning German soldiers that [its] archives 'se trouvaint sous la
protection de la Convention de la Haye,"' that is, the archives were under the
protection of the 1907 Hague Convention. 64 Posner challenges the director's
assertion on the ground that "[a]rchival establishments of a state ... are in the
158. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(b).
159. Id. art. l(a). The Iraqi National Library, collocated with the National Archives, was
expressly mentioned in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 in May 2003, which required
U.N. Member States "to facilitate the safe return to Iraqi institutions of Iraqi cultural property and
other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious importance
illegally removed from the Iraqi National Museum, the National Library, and other locations in
Iraq." S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 157, para. 7 (emphasis added).
160. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
161. Eskander, Cemetery of Books, supra note 131.
162. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, preamble.
163. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 27.
164. Posner, Public Records Under Military Occupation, supra note 22, at 214 n.2 (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
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first place service agencies of the government and only secondarily institutions
of a scientific character." 165 Similarly, the U.S. National Archives contains a
significant number of older records of considerable historical value that
nevertheless remain classified because their disclosure would, by definition, be
"reasonably expected" to cause damage to national security and could therefore
be of value to an adversary. 1
66
The Iraqi National Archives are not, in principle, excluded from protection
as cultural property simply because of their potential intelligence or military
value any more than the 1,200-year-old minaret at the mosque in Samarra was
denied protection as cultural property despite the potential military advantage
its 180-foot height could provide to a military sniper. 167 The central question
in each case is how the dual nature, function, or potential use of such property
affects the obligations of combatants to protect it, and whether, for example,
imperative military necessity allows combatants to use, destroy, or seize such
property. i68
Lastly, even if the Ba'ath party records within the National Archives
constituted cultural property, the possible ideological identity of such records
as symbols of the Ba'ath party might arguably affect their status in the same
manner as forms of German art, classified as Nazi property, during the post-
war "De-Nazification" of Germany. 169  Some have questioned, for example,
165. Id.
166. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 714 (Dec. 29, 2009).
167. See O'KEEFE, supra note 4, at 109 (noting that "there is no reason in principle why the
Convention should not apply to strategically significant immovable cultural property if the latter
genuinely satisfies the definition laid down in article I" of the 1954 Hague Convention). For a
legal analysis of the incident at Samarra, see Geoffrey S. Corn, "Snipers in the Minaret-What Is
the Rule? ": The Law of War and the Protection of Cultural Property: A Complex Equation,
ARMY LAW., July 2005, at 28, 34-40.
168. The decision not to submit the 1954 Hague Convention to the Senate for ratification
promptly after the United States became a signatory in 1954 arose in part from concerns at the
Department of Defense that the Soviet Union would attempt to use the Convention to immunize
the Kremlin from attack. Review of the Convention for the Protection of the Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, supra note 4, at 103-04. The issue was the "possible conflict
between the outstanding historic interest versus the politico-military use of the extremely
important architectural complex of the Moscow Kremlin." Id. at 104. Boylan notes that this was
a "serious misunderstanding" of the 1954 Hague Convention, under which the Kremlin could not
be immune from attack "unless all of its politico-military functions use had been totally
neutrali[z]ed or transferred elsewhere in advance of the hostilities." Id. In transmitting the
Convention to the Senate in 1999, the government noted that "[n]o concern remains in this regard
today" and acknowledged that the Convention "would not have prevented [an attack on the
Kremlin] in any case." Section-by-Section Analysis of the Hague Convention and the Hague
Protocol, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-1, at 6 (1999) [hereinafter Section-by-Section Analysis].
169. See Jonathan Drimmer, Hate Property: A Substantive Limitation for America's Cultural
Property Laws, 65 TENN. L. REv. 691, 694-95, 696 (1998) (discussing the confiscation of Nazi
art in World War II and stating that the U.S. government has "implicitly taken the position ...
that the broad and growing international legal consensus favoring protection and repatriation of
cultural property is subject to an exception for art that helps to reinforce and instill the dominant
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whether the destruction of statues of Saddam Hussein throughout Iraq could be
considered violations against cultural property.17 0 The apparent justification is
that such statues represented ideological symbols of the Ba'ath regime, that
their public destruction was a legitimate method of convincing Iraqis that the
Ba'ath regime was defeated, and that the destruction prevented the regime's
resurgence.171 CPA Order Number 1, for example, described the "grave"
threat to "Iraqi society.., posed by the continuation of Ba'ath Party networks
and personnel in the administration of Iraq, and the intimidation of the people
of Iraq by Ba'ath Party officials," and expressly prohibited "[d]isplays in
government buildings or public spaces the image or likeness of Saddam
Hussein" as well as "symbols of the Baath Party."'172  In relation to Ba'ath
party records and archives specifically, Human Rights Watch noted in early
April 2003 that in Basra, "British officials have publicly stated that they
allowed the looting of Ba'ath party buildings, which house important archives,
as a means of showing the population that the party had lost control of the
tenets of a genocidal culture"); see also Duane Michael Thompson, Boots to Booty: The
Overarching Restraints Imposed by Jus ad Bellum Justifications on Property Acquisition in War
94-100 (May 23, 2004) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, George Washington University Law School),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423834&Location=U2&doc=Get
TRDoc.pdf (discussing the status of "ideological cultural property"); see generally William E.
Griffith, Denazification in the United States Zone of Germany, 267 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
Soc. Sci. 68 (1950) (discussing, in general, the de-Nazification process following World War 1I).
170. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 825 (2005)
(stating that toppling Saddam's statue "constituted a belligerent attack on a foreign nation's
cultural property in the absence of any military necessity" and that it therefore "seems likely that
the statue's destruction violated international law"). Strahilevitz argues that if, in contrast, the
Iraqi government had destroyed the statue it "would be a liberating act and few would begrudge
an Iraqi government's decision to destroy public property in order to send a particular message"
because, although the statute had "significant historical value in memorializing a deposed
regime," such value "would be outweighed by the expressive and symbolic value associated with
this destruction." Id.
171. See id. at 824-35 (discussing, in general, the "expressive" value of destruction). By
comparison, certain forms of Nazi art were seized and permanently retained "out of a fear that
allowing the German people access to them could help revive the violent eliminationism that
became manifest in Nazi Germany and even potentially contribute to the rise of a Fourth Reich."
Drimmer, supra note 169, at 695. The long-term de-Nazification of Germany also involved the
de-Nazification of German archivists. See Astrid M. Eckert, Managing Their Own Past: German
Archivists Between National Socialism and Democracy, 7 ARCHIVAL SCI. 223, 229 (2007)
(explaining the effect of incorporating archivists into the de-Nazification effort).
172. CPA, Coaliton [sic] Provisional Authority Number 1: De-Ba'athification of Iraqi
Society, CPA Doc. CPA/OED/16 May 2003/01 (May 16, 2003) [hereinafter CPA Order No. I].
For a discussion of whether coalition reforms such as de-Ba'athification comported with, or
exceeded, the proper authority of an occupying power, see Fox, supra note 157, at 208 (stating
that "it is no exaggeration to describe the CPA as having engaged in a social engineering project
in Iraq"); see also Posner, Public Records Under Military Occupation, supra note 22, at 220
(noting that, although an occupying power could replace the existing administrative structures,
"[i]n practice ...the invader will not consider this to his advantage, since it involves him in
administrative and judicial detail with which the native officials are much better equipped to
cope").
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city.' 173 Although nothing indicates that the coalition forces intentionally left
the Iraqi National Archives unguarded on this basis,174 the potential ideological
nature of the Ba'ath party records and archives further complicates their
entitlement to protection.
2. Ba 'ath Party Actors and Occupation
Even assuming such Ba'ath party records at the National Archives
constituted cultural property, their destruction can be distinguished from the
looting at the National Museum by the identity, motive, and possible authority
of the actors involved. In addition to the findings of the Library of Congress
delegation and others that the destruction was not the work of random looters,
but well-organized individuals associated with the Ba'ath party, more specific
evidence indicates that "three days prior to the invasion staff members [of the
library) were instructed to destroy all archival material related to Ba'athist
rule." A Indeed, the possible content and value of these records provides both
a reason and justification for such orders.
The potential authority of the actors and the timing of the destruction in
early April 2003 further illustrate the complexity of the division between active
hostilities and occupation, and the corresponding legal rights and obligations of
the belligerents. Until the end of hostilities, for example, the destruction of
government records by retreating government officials, or by individuals
acting under official orders, in an attempt to deny the advancing enemy access
to the records is typical, rational, and, in the absence of some overriding
obligation to preserve, legitimate. 176  It is a last defensive act to limit the
173. Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Protect Government Archives from Looting (Apr. 9, 2003),
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/04/09/iraq-protect-government-archives-looting.
174. If Article 4(3) of the 1954 Hague Convention obligates parties to prevent vandalism and
looting by local enemy civilians, it might also prohibit inaction where a military justification is
present because Article 4(3) is usually understood as excepted from waivers of military necessity.
See Sandholtz, supra note 49, at 230 (stating that the military necessity clause does not apply to
Article 4(3) and the United States did not insist on such a qualification during the drafting of the
1954 Hague Convention); see also O'KEEFE, supra note 4, at 133 ("Neither limb [of article 4(3)]
is subject to article 4(2)'s waiver in respect of military necessity.").
175. A1-Tikriti, supra note 138, at 733. More generally, a document purporting to be a top-
secret order from the Iraqi Secret Service, dated January 2003 and later published in the London-
based newspaper Al Hayat, mandated that, in "the event of the downfall of the Iraqi leadership in
the hands of the American, British, and Zionist forces," there should be "burning of all state
agencies connected with our directorates." A Top Secret Document Dated January 23, 2003from
Iraqi Intelligence: A Plan for Action in the Event of a Regime Downfall, MIDDLE EAST MEDIA
RESEARCH INST., July 17, 2003, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0l0/0/909.
htm. The authenticity of this document, however, is questionable. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 130, at 5 (noting that "[flormer Iraqi government officials shredded, burned, or
otherwise destroyed many documents" in the weeks before the invasion).
176. Under U.S. law, for example, the destruction of federal records located outside the
United States is permitted during war or "when hostile action by a foreign power appears
imminent." 44 U.S.C. § 3311 (2006); see DEP'T OF ARMY, AR 380-5, INFORMATION SECURITY
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damage of losing a city or territory.1 77 The uncertain line between hostilities
and occupation thus creates a legal teeter-totter: at some point, a nascent
occupier potentially may have a legal obligation under the 1907 Hague
Regulations to prevent the same type of destruction of state property that the
waning government arguably has the right to undertake in its final defense.
Accordingly, the identity and possible authority of those who destroyed the
Ba'ath party records, combined with the unresolved uncertainty about the exact
time when occupation began impacts the relevant international legal
obligations in several ways.
First, the residual authority of the Ba'ath party that the destruction evidenced
calls into question whether the United States occupied Baghdad between April
10 and April 14 and, therefore, whether the general duties of the occupying
power to restore order under Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations were
triggered.
Second, even if the provision in Article 4(3) of the 1954 Hague Convention
that requires parties to prevent "vandalism" to cultural property properly
applies to the actions of enemy civilians, the provision may still be
inapplicable to destruction undertaken pursuant to potentially lawful orders.,
78
Such acts would arguably not constitute "vandalism," which, like "pillage" and
"theft," generally involve actions taken without authority or justification.179
Third, if these records were, in fact, cultural property, their destruction
would potentially implicate Iraq's own obligations under Article 4(1) of the
1954 Hague Convention, which prohibits "any act of hostility directed against"
cultural property.180 Although this provision is most often cited as a restriction
on the actions of the "attacking" party, it applies equally to the "defending"
government. That is, in principle at least, this provision forbids a nation from
destroying its own cultural property.'8 1  This distinction is particularly
important with respect to records and archives given that, as discussed earlier,
PROGRAM 18-20 (2000) [hereinafter DEP'T OF ARMY 380-51 (discussing destruction of classified
military documents in the event of emergency).
177. See DEP'T OF ARMY 380-5, supra note 176, at 18-20; CORDESMAN, supra note 156, at
114 (noting that Iraqi Republican Guard forces were "digging in the area of Tikrit" after
"coalition forces had effectively defeated organized resistance in Baghdad").
178. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(3).
179. Id. Further, if Article 4(3) of the 1954 Hague Convention does not require a party to
prevent "vandalism" by local civilians, as some have argued, afortiori it should not require a
party to prevent individuals, whether military or civilian, acting pursuant to (possibly) lawful
orders of the retreating government. See Gerstenblith, supra note 17, at 330-31. But see
O'KEEFE, supra note 4, at 133 (arguing that Article 4(3) requires a party to prevent acts
committed "by remnants of the opposing armed forces").
180. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
181. Id. UNESCO, for example, cited the principles of the 1954 Hague Convention in its
condemnation of the Taliban's destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan, despite the
fact the Taliban were effectively the ruling government. UNESCO, Declaration Concerning the
Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, Oct. 17, 2003. But see O'KEEFE, supra note 4, at 98
(contesting UNESCO's analysis of the status of the Taliban).
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"defending" nations constitute one of the most significant threats of
destruction. 1  This prohibition, however, is subject to the same Article 4(2)
waiver for imperative military necessity that is available to the "attacking"
party. 183 Given the potential value of Ba'ath party records at issue, the
legitimacy of a military-necessity waiver for the actions of Ba'ath party actors
cannot be excluded.
Finally, although there may be an international legal responsibility to
prevent the destruction of records and archives, the potential intelligence and
political value of these records may decrease the need for such affirmative
legal obligations. For example, the United States should have had a practical
incentive to secure these records and archives based on their potential
importance both to coalition intelligence operations and to the subsequent
administration of the occupation.' s 4 In fact, on April 14, 2003, the same day
these records may have been destroyed, Donald Rumsfeld, United States
Secretary of Defense, stated that "[w]e are looking for people .. who can help
us find records, for example, of Baath Party members and the like."'
185
The loss of government records also affected the early plan for governance
because the United States intended to rely on the existing bureaucratic
structures.' 8 6  Such plans quickly "became untenable when those structures
dissolved" and "[1]ooters gutted seventeen of twenty-three ministries, stealing
or destroying their records."' 87 Thus, even in the absence of any international
legal obligation to prevent destruction, practical reasons may have justified
readying additional resources for securing the National Archives and
protecting its collections to serve the political and intelligence interests of the
U.S. government.
B. Ba 'ath Party Records Seized by U.S. Personnel
A second set of Ba'ath party records are those included among 48,000 boxes
of documents the United States or coalition forces seized during the war and its
aftermath. Although the exact content of these records is not publicly known,
a 2004 Washington Post editorial estimated that when "coalition forces
182. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
183. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(2).
184. Indeed, the likelihood that these records could have been useful to the invading U.S.
forces is only enhanced by the Ba'ath party's efforts to destroy them.
185. Don Van Natta, Jr. & David Johnston, US. Search for Illegal Arms Narrowed to About
36 Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2003, at B4.
186. CELESTE J. WARD, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT: THE COALITION
PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY'S EXPERIENCE WITH GOVERNANCE IN IRAQ 3-4 (2005) (explaining
that the initial plan for the war and a new government in the postwar period was to remove
Saddam and the highest levels of leadership, but keep "broad structures of the bureaucracy... in
place" to administer the country, or, more succinctly, "[t]he coalition would cut off the head of
the snake but leave the body").
187. Id. at2.
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captured Baghdad, they took control of some 80 percent of the former Iraqi
regime's documents-hundreds of millions of pieces of paper-and moved
them to an undisclosed location outside Iraq," which has subsequently been
revealed as Doha, Qatar. 188 According to congressional testimony, "at the
point of capture" these documents were "immediately triaged for any tactical
value" and eventually "sent back to the rear to Doha to be catalogued, indexed,
scanned, and triaged by a team of linguists."'1 89 The documents were then
entered into a database called "Harmony," which made them "available to the
entire intelligence community to query against."'
' 90
The primary controversies surrounding these records concern allegations
regarding the legality of their initial seizure and recent and repeated calls for
their return to the control of the Iraqi government. In April 2008, for example,
the Society of American Archivists stated that for "records of the Iraqi
government, including the Baath Party records as an arm of the state, the
archival principle of inalienability requires that they be returned to the national
government of Iraq for preservation in the national archives."'191  In
considerably stronger terms, in late 2008, the current Director General of the
Iraqi National Library and Archives, Saad Eskander, condemned the
"continuing refusal of the U.S. to pay serious attention to Iraqi calls for the
repatriation of the Iraqi records illegally seized by its military and intelligence
agencies." 192
1. The Initial Seizure of Ba 'ath Party Records
Under the law of armed conflict, the legality of U.S. and coalition seizures
of Ba'ath party records depends upon the nature of these records, the
circumstances of their capture, and the presence or absence of military
necessity. Regarding the nature of Ba'ath party records, because the Ba'ath
party was the sole ruling party in Iraq from 1968 to 2003, the prevailing view
is that these records constituted state property.193 Relevant provisions of the
law of armed conflict therefore include those provisions governing the
188. Editorial, Iraq's Archives, supra note 140.
189. Iraqi Documents, supra note 129, at 34.
190. Id.
191. Soc'y of Am. Archivists & Ass'n of Canadian Archivists, supra note 1.
192. Eskander, Minerva Research Initiative, supra note 2.
193. See CPA Order No. 4, supra note 137, at I ("[P]roperty of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party
constitute[s] State assets, the Iraqi government having been a one party State under the rule of the
Ba'athists from the years 1968 to 2003."). Similarly, the Society of American Archivists states
that the records of the Ba'ath party, "as an arm of the state," constitute Iraqi government records.
Soc'y of Am. Archivists & Ass'n of Canadian Archivists, supra note 1. Cf H.A. Smith, Booty of
War, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 227, 229 (1946) ("In the late war all property belonging to the Nazi
or to the Fascist parties or to their affiliated organizations has been treated as state property, a
decision which followed logically from the complete identification of state and party under
totalitarian systems of government.").
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treatment of enemy moveable public property during war and belligerent
occupation.
Further, Ba'ath party records seized in active or recently active government
offices most likely do not constitute cultural property. As the former Acting
Archivist of the United States, Trudy Huskamp Peterson, has noted, although
one could describe, for example, current "records of the secret police" as
"archives" in a broader sense, these records probably do not constitute archival
cultural property under the 1954 Hague Convention because the Convention's
protections are primarily understood to extend to "noncurrent historical
materials, 9particularly those housed in a facility designated as an historical
archive."' 9  Most crucially, the intent to treat these records as cultural
property, which is manifest with respect to the Ba'ath records contained within
the Iraqi National Archives, is notably absent with respect to those records
seized by U.S. forces elsewhere in Iraq. In fact, the Director General of the
Iraqi National Archives, although condemning the United States as the world's
"hungriest scavenger" of foreign records and characterizing its seizure of Iraqi
records as "illegal," nevertheless states
[i]f one divides the looted and destroyed Iraqi records into
different categories-e.g. political, military-security, administrative,
and cultural-one will find that the Americans were not interested in
cultural records whatsoever. (By cultural records I mean the ones
that are stored in national archives or libraries). The Americans were
however extremely interested in seizing current records of a political
and security-military nature.' 
95
Relevant standards during hostilities, therefore, include the 1907 Hague
Regulations, which forbid the seizure of enemy property unless such seizure is
"imperatively demanded by the necessities of war." U.S. Central Command
orders in force at the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq reiterated this general
principle mandating that "public property may be seized during exercises or
operations only on order of the Commander, when based on military
necessity."' 97 Further, under the 1907 Hague Regulations, the occupying army
may take possession of "all movable property belonging to the State which
may be used for military operations." 9
The argument that seizing Ba'ath party documents was a military necessity
and that such records properly constituted military objectives appears
194. See Peterson, supra note 21, at 271.
195. Eskander, Minerva Research Initiative, supra note 2.
196. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 23(g).
197. U.S. CENT. COMMAND, GO-IA PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES FOR U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE PERSONNEL PRESENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
(USCENTCOM) AOR (2000), reprinted in 1 CTR. FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS,
LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ app. G- I at 76-77 (2004).
198. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 53.
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compelling.' 99 First, during initial hostilities, Ba'ath party records constituted
documents of the enemy military and government. Second, regardless of when
the period of belligerent occupation formally commenced, the United States
continued to undertake significant combat operations, some of which were
directly targeted at former Ba'ath party elements.2 00 As a general matter, the
rules governing enemy property during hostilities continue to apply to combat
military operations even if they occur in a territory under occupation.
201
Additionally, the seizure of the Ba'ath party documents was important for
maintaining security.
202
At the same time, the breadth and extent of the captured records raises
legitimate concerns over the necessity and proportionality of such seizures.
Enemy government offices and the documents contained within them, for
example, are not necessarily "military objectives. ' '203 Further, given the often-
noted lack of Arabic speakers in the U.S. military, the "impulse to sweep up all
documents and sort them out later" was likely "well near irresistible" for U.S.
troops finding stashes of documents in Iraqi government offices.
2 ° 4
199. Indeed, this argument includes both many of the same reasons that would have justified
securing the even older, less current Ba'ath party records in the Iraqi National Archives which
were of interest to U.S. forces (that is, those having potential military, intelligence, and
administrative value) and the same reasons the United States was criticized for failing to secure
more governmental records throughout Iraq. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
200. See 2 CTR. FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ 10-13 (2004) (describing "Continuing Combat Operations" during the
occupation, including Operation DESERT SCORPION in June 2003 designed "to identify and
defeat selected Ba'ath party loyalists"; Operation SODA MOUNTAIN in July 2003, a "major
operation" resulting in the capture of "62 former regime leaders"; as well as attempts by coalition
forces to quell a rebellion of "loyalists of Saddam Hussein" in April 2004); see also CPA Order
No. 1, supra note 172, at I (noting "the continuing threat to the security of the Coalition Forces
posed by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party").
201. See DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 69, at 99-100 (describing the
"duality of hostilities and occupation" and stating that "actual combat conducted against the
Occupying Power either by enemy regular troops . . . or by locally organized insurgents" is
"governed by the standard norms of [the law of international armed conflict]"); O'KEEFE, supra
note 4, at 31 ("Crucially, if the military forces of an Occupying Power are involved in military
operations during belligerent occupation, whether to quell armed resistance to the occupation, to
defend against the enemy's attempt to recapture the territory or to cover a retreat from it, the
provisions on hostilities apply.").
202. Iraqi Documents, supra note 129 (stressing the need for careful review so that captured
"documents that might hurt an innocent Iraqi who could be the victim of retribution, for example,
are not inadvertently released to the public").
203. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 94, 98 (2004) [hereinafter DINSTEN, CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES] (noting that "[g]overnment offices can be considered legitimate targets for attack
only when used in pursuance or support of military functions").
204. Peterson, supra note 21, at 273. Further, the exhaustive search for evidence of weapons
of mass destruction, for example, by the Iraq Survey Group included particularly intensive
seizures of documents for exploitation. See CHARLES DUELFER, HIDE AND SEEK: THE SEARCH
FOR TRUTH IN IRAQ 339-41 (2009).
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Unfortunately, the dearth of information regarding the content of seized
records prevents a more detailed assessment. In 2006, for example, three years
after the war began, less than fifteen percent of seized documents had been
fully translated. Further, public descriptions of the circumstances of capture
are exceedingly vague, such as the DoD's statement that the documents "came
206into the possession of' the United States. The public release of a selected
number of documents, along with cover sheets from the "Harmony" database
indicating some "capture information," provides limited, but selective,
details. 2W Although such publicly released records are not necessarily a
representative sample, they nevertheless generally appear to be of a military
character.
20 8
2. The Current Status of Seized Ba 'ath Party Records
The more significant issues under international law are the effect of seizures;
the legal status of Ba'ath party records now, over seven years later; and the
uncertain ownership and proper location of the records. The central legal
issue, which largely has been ignored, is whether legal title to Ba'ath party
records U.S. forces lawfully seized pursuant to military necessity may have
passed to the U.S. government.
20 9
205. INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, IRAQ PERSPECTIVES PROJECT: SADDAM AND TERRORISM:
EMERGING INSIGHTS FROM CAPTURED IRAQI DOCUMENTS v (2007) [hereinafter INST. FOR DEF.
ANALYSES], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/iraqi/index.html. In March 2006, the
government took the unprecedented step of uploading untranslated captured Iraqi documents onto
a public website in order to, in the words of one Congressman, "'unleash the power of the Net' to
do translation and analysis that might take the government decades." Scott Shane, Iraqi
Documents Are Put on Web, and Search Is on, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2006, at Al. The project
was subsequently halted and the documents removed following concerns from arms-control
officials that certain documents included details about nuclear weapons. William J. Broad, U.S.
Web Archive is Said to Reveal Nuclear Primer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2008, at Al. In 2008 the
DoD, while soliciting civilian research proposals on the records, stated a preference for "studies
that exploit materials that have not been previously translated." IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT,
supra note 3, at 19.
206. IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT, supra note 3, at 19; see DUELFER, supra note 204, at 339
(describing "heaps of documents" in April 2003 "left exposed to the elements" at the Baghdad
airport that "were eventually put in garbage bags" and that documents "sometimes had some data
describing where they were collected, but often did not").
207. See generally INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, supra note 205; see also Iraqi Documents,
supra note 129 (stating that the documents were carefully evaluated "to ensure that documents
that would perhaps harm United States interests are not released inadvertently to the public").
208. See generally INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, supra note 205 (including translations of a
number of the seized Iraqi records); see also DUELFER, supra note 204, at 340 (describing the
"range of fascinating documents" captured by U.S. forces).
209. See Exec. Order No. 13,290, 3 C.F.R. 192 (2003), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. §
1702 (2006) (determining that the "United States and Iraq are engaged in armed hostilities" and
vesting in the Department of Treasury "all right, title, and interest" of certain financial property of
the Government of Iraq and announcing the intention "that such vested property should be used to
assist the Iraqi people and to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq").
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U.S. Central Command orders reiterated the general principle that "[p]ublic
property seized by the U.S. Armed Forces is the property of the United
States. '210 This would arguably be the result for Ba'ath party records seized
during the initial period of hostilities and during subsequent active combat
operations, even if the seizure occurred during the period of belligerent
occupation. Under the law of both armed conflict and also the United States,
such Ba'ath party records may constitute war booty or "spoils of war., 211 The
status of other Ba'ath party records seized during the occupation depends upon
whether they were susceptible to military use and whether seizure was
necessary for "military operations" pursuant to Article 53 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations.
2 12
In an April 2003 letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, however, the Archivist of the
United States urged, on the basis of "established international norms" that
"original Iraqi records secured by Coalition forces will and should eventually
be the legal property of a new Iraqi Government." 21 3 The Archivist stated that
this "approach" had been used by the DoD and endorsed by the National
Archives for records seized in 1989 during Operation "Just Cause" in
Panama. 214 He noted that scanning seized records would "allow American
forces to obtain copies of virtually any type of record that will be necessary for
military and intelligence purposes. 21
Moreover, the strict application of the law of armed conflict and the
treatment of Ba'ath party records as U.S. property appears to be in some
conflict with public statements of the United States and the CPA that suggest
different intentions for Ba'ath party property. The April 16, 2003, "Freedom
to the Iraqi People" message from General Franks, for example, began by
stating that "Iraq and its property belong to the Iraqi People and the Coalition
makes no claim of ownership by force of arms." '  On May 14, 2003, a
representative from the DoD testified before Congress that DoD policy would
specify "that seized state- and regime-owned property shall be held on behalf
and for the benefit of the Iraqi people and shall only be used to assist the Iraqi
people in support of reconstruction of Iraq." 2 17 Further, in late May 2003,
CPA Order Number 4, although mandating that all Ba'ath party property was
210. U.S. CENT. COMMAND, supra note 197, at 378.
211. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
212. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 53; ICRC STUDY, supra note 103, at
178 (stating that under international law "[iun occupied territory ... movable public property that
can be used for military operations may be confiscated").
213. Letter from John W. Carlin to Donald H. Rumsfeld, supra note 124, at 1.
214. Id. at 1-2.
215. Id.
216. Franks, supranote 135, at47.
217. Divesting Saddam: Freezing, Seizing, and Repatriating Saddam 's Money to the Iraqis:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial
Services, 108th Cong. 10 (2003) (statement of Lawrence Lanzillotta, Principal Deputy and
Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Mgmt. Reform, Dep't of Def.).
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subject to seizure, stated that the CPA would "hold in trust and for the use and
benefit of the people of Iraq all the said property and assets of the Ba'ath
Party. 218
Such statements potentially may be explained away on the basis that General
Franks was simply clarifying the intent of coalition forces to temporarily
occupy, rather than permanently subjugate, Iraq. One could also argue that the
DoD was referring to financial assets of Iraq, or that such statements reflect
general policies rather than any surrender of the legal rights of the United
States to such property. Yet the essence of the current controversy over Ba'ath
party records seized by U.S. forces is the perceived disconnect between the
sentiment of these statements and the actual use and treatment of these records,
and the inadequacy of international law in bridging the gap.
That Ba'ath party records may have constituted military objectives and
likely were not protected as cultural property at the time that the United States
seized them says nothing about the actual historical value of their content,
which, given the heated and continual debate over their custody, appears
considerable. 219 Years later, the DoD expressly acknowledged the records'
historical and cultural value in its controversial "Iraq Perspectives Project., 220
In June 2008, as part of a larger social science program called the Minerva
Research Initiative, the DoD solicited research proposals from U.S.
universities to study the "vast number of documents and other media" the DoD
obtained during Operation Iraqi Freedom that form part of a "growing
declassified archive." 22' The stated goal of the project is to "explore the
political, social, and cultural workings and changes within Iraq during the
years Saddam Hussein was in power. 222 The current Director General of the
Iraqi National Archives, Saad Eskander, complains that the United States is
providing U.S. universities access to crucial documents of Iraqi history in order
to conduct academic studies while denying Iraqis, to whom that history is the
most critical, the same access and opportunity.
218. CPAOrderNo. 4, supranote 137, § 3(4).
219. Similarly, a World War 11 Memorandum for U.S. Forces noted that "[t]he administrative
records of today are the research materials of tomorrow that will be indispensable to the historian,
to the sociologist, and to the economist. They should receive the same care as cultural objects."
U.S. NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., AUTH. No. 790029, MEMORANDUM CONCERNING
THE PROTECTION AND SALVAGE OF CULTURAL OBJECTS AND RECORDS IN WAR AREAS 2-3 (on
file with author).
220. See IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT, supra note 3, at 19.
221. Id.
222. Id. Suggested examples of "appropriate research might be studies of leadership
dynamics; social psychological studies of national identity and political unity; and Iraqi
perceptions of international relations and systems." Id. The DoD further noted that it sought
"research that fosters scholarship in the area of cross-cultural awareness, cross-cultural
competence and cultural intelligence." Id.
223. Eskander, Minerva Research Initiative, supra note 2. Eskander, however, couches his
criticism in international law by alleging that the Iraqi Perspectives Project "constitutes an
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If the content of these records and the circumstances of their seizure were
more precisely known, an evaluation of their status under international law
could lead to conclusions similar to those concerning the captured German
records the United States held after World War II:
While considerable quantities of these records may still be needed
for purposes of intelligence, for research in the history of the prewar
and war periods . . . and while others may be considered bonafide
war booty that may be retained indefinitely, it would seem that those
portions of the records that pertain to the internal history during the
recent period, can and should be restituted after an appropriate
repository for the administration of such material has been set up.224
A law passed by the Iraqi Parliament in January 2008 may have begun the
process of identifying such an "appropriate repository" by mandating that
"[a]ll files of the Dissolved Ba'ath Party... be transferred to the Government
in order to be kept until a permanent Iraqi archive is established pursuant to the
law. ' 225 Further, in early 2010, an Iraqi delegation to the United States, which
included Director General Saad Eskander, reportedly met with State
Department officials to begin negotiations for the possible return of the
records .226
escalation in [the U.S.'s] violation of international conventions on the safeguarding of cultural
heritage of occupied territories." Id. Neither the First Protocol of 1954 Hague Convention, nor
the 1970 UNESCO Convention, both of which contain prohibitions on the removal of cultural
property from occupied territory, however, reasonably could be read to prohibit the removal of
recently captured, current records of the enemy government, which may have become U.S.
property. See supra notes 92-94, 103-05 and accompanying text. More simply, such records
were not, at the time of capture or transfer, cultural property. Even if the 48,000 boxes of
captured records sitting in a military warehouse in Qatar arguably could have later matured into
"archives" constituting cultural property, such instruments would not provide retroactive legal
effect, although they could provide a prospective one. Consider, for example, whether any future
obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention would extend to Qatar, which has been a party to
the main 1954 Hague Convention since 1973 and a party to the Second Protocol since 1999, and
in whose territory the records are located. See UNESCO, Report on the Implementation of the
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Prop. 8, 28 (2005).
224. Pomrenze, supra note 24, at 25 (quoting ERNST POSNER, AGAR-S DOc. NO. 301,
REPORT ON PUBLIC ARCHIVES OF GERMANY 58 (1949)).
225. Law of the Supreme National Commission for Accountibility [sic] and Justice, Art. 4(b),
(Jan. 17, 2008) (enacted), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content7/6/766.pdf. This is an
unofficial translation provided by the International Center for Transitional Justice. Id.
226. See Aseel Kami, Iraq Asks U.S. to Return Millions of Archive Documents,
ARABNEWS.COM, May 20, 2010, http://arabnews.com/middleeast/article55519.ece (stating that
U.S. and Iraqi officials were in negotiations regarding the documents); see also Posting of Jeff
Spurr, jbspurr@gmail.com, to Iraq Crisis List, iraqcrisis@lists.uchicago.edu (May 19, 2010)
[hereinafter Eskander Report], available at https://lists.uchicago.edu/web/arc/iraqcrisis/2010-
05/msg00008.html (including a report of the negotiations reportedly prepared by Saad Eskander).
Several news reports erroneously stated that the United States and Iraq had come to an agreement
on the return of the records. See e.g., Iraq Strikes Deal with US for Return of Archives, AFP,
May 13, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gFIoPz IOBsZoOZiEuFg
IET5TvC3w (stating that the United States "has agreed to return millions of documents to Iraq").
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In considering the possible transfer of Ba'ath party records to Iraq, the
United States will face issues similar to those surrounding the return of
captured German records following World War II. In 1953 when the United
States "donated" captured German records to Germany, it expressly excluded
from those returned records both "military, intelligence . . . documents, that
would, if returned, jeopardize the national security interests of the United
States or its Allies" and any "[dlocuments tending to glorify the Nazi regime,
or which are of inherent propaganda character, or which deal with the
organization, personnel, and operation of Nazi Party institutions, except where
such transfer would not jeopardize the democratic way of life in the Federal
Republic., 227  Given similarities between de-Nazification and de-
Ba'athification, ongoing political violence in Iraq, the continuing presence of
U.S. troops, and the fact that certain documents reportedly contain information
on nuclear technology, the United States may wish to retain exclusive custody
of at least a portion of the documents for a significant period of time, if not
indefinitely.
2 28
The final outcome, as with earlier dispositions of records captured by U.S.
forces, will likely come about as a matter of diplomacy rather than law,
although the two are interrelated. If the U.S government, for example, has
adopted the position advocated by the U.S. Archivist, that the original records
remain Iraqi property 229 and their return would be characterized more as
repatriation than voluntary donation, 23 the long-term exclusion of the Iraqi
government from aportion of its own property may appear suspect both legally
and diplomatically.
227. U.S. ARCHIVES, SEIZED GERMAN RECORDS, supra note 118 (emphasis added).
228. See Iraqi Documents, supra note 129 (noting that seized documents could present
dangers to Iraqis who could become "victim[s] of retribution"); Broad, supra note 205 (stating
that captured Iraqi records contain information on nuclear weapons).
229. Although the U.S. government has not taken an official public position on the precise
legal status of these records, correspondence between the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) appear to suggest that the DIA
intended to treat scanned copies of these records, rather than the originals, as records of the U.S.
government. See Letter from Paul M. Wester, Jr., Director, Life Cycle Management Division,
NARA, to Jack Tartella, Chief, Public Assess and Distribution Division, DIA (Sept. 8, 2004) (on
file with author) (requesting DIA's plans for treating as federal records "the scanned copies of
captured records and related processing records handled by the Combined Media Processing
Center (CMPC) in Qatar"); see also Letter from Jack Tartella, Chief, Public Access and
Distribution Division, DIA, to Paul M. Wester, Jr., director, Life Cycle Management Division,
NARA (undated) (on file with author) (responding that the DIA intends to create a new records
disposition schedule to cover "all scanned copies of captured records" in Qatar). Whether the
government also has determined, however, that the original seized records remain Iraqi property
is unclear.
230. Letter from John W. Carlin to Donald H. Rumsfeld, supra note 124.
231. A similar issue arose in relation to the documents seized from Haiti during the 1994
U.S. invasion. The government of Haiti demanded the return of the documents and forty
members of Congress, in a letter to President Clinton, stated that "[t]here is absolutely no
justification why these materials should be in the hands of our government now that the legitimate
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C. Ba'ath Party Records in Party Headquarters
While the Ba'ath party archives at the Iraqi National Archives were in
flames and U.S. forces were seizing others throughout Iraq, a third tranche of
Ba'ath party documents sat in the basement of Ba'ath party headquarters in
Baghdad. Over seven years later, these records are now located at the
Hoover Institution at Stanford University.233  The records' journey and the
corresponding facts are not authoritatively documented and can only be
cobbled together from news articles and interviews that are not always
consistent.
After the fall of Baghdad, perhaps in the summer of 2003, Kenan Makiya,
the head of a non-governmental organization called the Iraq Memory
Foundation (IMF), entered Ba'ath party headquarters in Baghdad where a U.S.
soldier "pointed out a trap door at the tomb of one of its founders. Below it
were rooms full of records that had escaped the looting: membership files,
reports from informants and huge ledgers containing notes on every male
student in the country." 234 The CPA reportedly gave Makiya permission to
take custody of the records, and he transported them to a house belonging to
his family located in the Baghdad Green Zone.
235
In August 2004, after sovereignty was transferred to the interim Iraqi
government, the Iraqi prime minister's office reportedly authorized the IMF
"to collect 'documents pertaining to harm committed by the former regime",
for the purposes of establishing a "national institution" in Bagdhad. The
plan, however, was abandoned, at least temporarily, because of the security
situation in Iraq. 237 At some point thereafter, the IMF reportedly entered into
an agreement with the United States and, as a result, shipped the records to
238Virginia where the U.S. government scanned them. In 2005, the IMF
government of Haiti has been restored." Letter from Representative John Conyers et al. to
President Clinton (Dec. 1, 1995), reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. 12,513 (1996). The United States,
however, wanted to retain control of the records for national security purposes. See Rohter, supra
note 125, at A18 (stating that an "American official said 'there may be legitimate national
security reasons for withholding' the documents and expressed concern that their release could
'encourage violence' in Haiti"). After returning "about half' of the documents, the United States
wanted to negotiate guarantees from Haiti about how the remaining documents would be used if
returned. All Things Considered (NPR broadcast Feb. 6, 1996). An attorney for the Haitian
government compared the U.S. position to a burglar stealing property and then offering to
negotiate about which part will be returned. Id.
232. Alexandra Zavis, Millions of Pages ofIraqi Pain, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at Al.
233. Kamil Dada, Hoover Archives Ba 'ath Party Records, STAN. DAILY, Feb. 27, 2008, at 1.
234. Zavis, supra note 232.
235. Eakin, supra note 1; see Lale Kuyumcu, Kanan Makiya Presses for Museum, Archive
Center on Iraq's Baathist Regime, America.gov, Dec. 31, 2003, http://www.america.
gov/st/washfile-english/2003lDecember/2003123117215 5xlucmuyuk0.3884546.html.
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apparently undertook unsuccessful negotiations with Harvard University about
housing the records there.23 9 In January 2008, the Hoover Institution agreed to
take custody of the archives, which amounted to between five and seven
240
million records, for five years.
The controversy grew after news of the agreement between the IMF and the
Hoover Institution became public. In April 2008, the Society of American
Archivists alleged that, under the "laws of war," the actions of the IMF "may
be considered an act of pillage, which is specifically forbidden by the 1907
Hague Convention. "241 It further claimed that the "records of the government
bodies and the Baath Party should be returned to the government of Iraq to be
maintained as part of the official records in the National Library and
Archives." 242 The Hoover Institution responded that the archivists made these
allegations "without knowledge of the participation and support the Iraqi
government" had given to the "project" and clarified that the agreement was "a
deposit agreement, which stipulates that the documents will be returned to Iraq
when a suitable archival depository there has been identified ... ,,243 The
Hoover Institution's response also enclosed correspondence from the "Senior
Deputy of the Ministry of Culture," which stated that "the Iraqi government
has approved the interim deposit agreement signed by the [IMF] and the
Hoover Institution. 244
The growing feud continued in June 2008 when the Director General of the
Iraqi Archives posted an "Open Letter to the Hoover Institution" stating that
the records had been "illegally seized" and that other sectors of the Iraqi
government supported the Iraqi National Archives' claim to these records.
2 45
Two days later, a second letter from the Iraqi Ministry of Culture surfaced, this
time from the Acting Minister, that disclaimed the Hoover Institution's
previous letter, contending that it reflected neither "Iraqi government policies
nor express[ed] opinions of [its] ministry," but rather, that the Ministry's
policy was "to work on regaining those records as they are part of [sic]
national heritage of Iraq. 246 The letter ended with an "absolute rejection" of
239. Dada, supra note 233.
240. Eakin, supra note I (stating that the archives handed over to the Hoover Institution
consist of over five million pages); Gorlick, supra note 141 (stating that the Hoover Institution
took custody of seven million records).
241. Soc'y of Am. Archivists & Ass'n of Canadian Archivists, supra note 1.
242. 1d.
243. Letter from Richard Sousa, Senior Assoc. Dir. Hoover Inst., to Mark A. Green,
President, Soc'y of Am. Archivists (June 6, 2008) [hereinafter Letter from Richard Sousa],
available at http://www.archivists.org/statements/Iraqi%20RecordsHooverLetter.pdf.
244. Memorandum from Jaber al-Jaberi, Senior Deputy of the Ministry of Culture (Apr. 27,
2008), available at http://www.archivists.org/statements/raqi%20RecordsHooverLetter.pdf.
245. Letter from Saad Eskander, Dir.-Gen., Iraq Nat'l Library & Archives, to the Dir. of the
Hoover Inst. (June 21, 2008), available at http://libraryjuicepress.comblog/?p=439.
246. Letter from Akram M. Hadi, Acting Minister of Culture, Republic of Iraq, to Mark A.
Green, President, Soc'y of Am. Archivists (June 23, 2008), available at
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the statement that the agreement between the IMF and the Hoover Institution
was approved by the Iraqi government, alleging that those organizations had
"violated Iraqi legislations" and "worked against" the interests of the Iraqi
people.
247
As of mid-2010, the Hoover Institution and an Iraqi delegation were in
negotiations concerning the status and possible return of the Ba'ath party
records. According to a report of the negotiations, allegedly written by Saad
Eskander, the Iraqi delegation and representatives of the Hoover Institution are
now in agreement, at least among themselves, that the "Ba'ath Party archive is
the property of the Iraqi people" and that the "elected government of Iraq
represents the Iraqi people." 2 8 The debate over the possible return of the
249
records to Iraq, however, continues.
1. The Legal Status of the IMF Ba 'ath Party Records
Missing and contradictory information and the ongoing factual disputes over
authority complicate any attempt to determine the precise legal status of the
Ba'ath party records at the Hoover Institution under international law. Even
the Director of the Hoover Institution's Archives claims not to know who
"technically owns the documents."25 Nevertheless, the available facts and
chain of events provide some relevant guidance. At the beginning of the war
in 2003, the IMF documents, like records captured by U.S. and coalition forces
elsewhere in Iraq, may have constituted enemy public property and, given that
there is little indication to suggest that the previous regime treated them as
historical documents, they likely did not qualify as cultural property under the
1954 Hague Convention.
At some point prior to the involvement of Makiya and the IMF, U.S. forces
secured the Ba'ath party building.252 This raises the question of whether the
United States had "seized" these documents in situ either as enemy property on
https://lists.uchicago.eduweb/arc/iraqcrisis/2008-06/msgOOOI 4/MoC_sLetter to Mr. Greene.
jpg. Eskander also alleged that the memorandum signed by al-Jaberi was actually written by an
IMF director who deceived al-Jaberi into signing it. See Letter from Saad Eskander to the Dir. of
the Hoover Inst., supra note 245.
247. Letter from Akram M. Hadi to Mark A. Green, supra note 246.
248. Eskander Report, supra note 226.
249. See Devin Banerjee, Iraq Asks Hoover to Return Records, STANFORD DAILY, May 25,
2010, http://www.stanforddaily.com/2010/05/25/iraq-asks-hoover-to-return-records/ (noting that
Iraq had requested the return of Ba'ath party records, but that "Hoover is resisting because it
doesn't deem security in Baghdad sufficient to ensure the documents' security").
250. Gorlick, supra note 141. Following the 2010 negotiations, Sousa stated that these
"papers belong to the Iraqi people." Banerjee, supra note 249.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75. Arguably, the placement of the records
under a "trapdoor at the tomb" of a party founder suggests that the former Iraqi government
treated these as "archives" of the Ba'ath party; however, no additional evidence appears to
support this. Zavis, supra note 232.
252. Zavis, supra note 232.
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the battlefield or as abandoned property. An answer depends on details
regarding the intent and actions of U.S. forces. "Valid capture or seizure of
property," states the U.S. Army Field Manual, "requires both an intent to take
such action and a physical act of capture or seizure. The mere presence within
occupied territory of property which is subject to appropriation under
international law does not operate to vest title thereto in the occupant. ' 253 On
the available facts, therefore, it appears that the United States may not have
formally seized such documents, although additional facts could alter that
analysis.
By the time Kenan Makiya arrived at the headquarters in the summer of
2003, the legal status of the Ba'ath party and the occupation was clearer. The
message of General Franks on April 16, 2003, for example, had
"disestablished" the Ba'ath party.254 The CPA supplemented General Frank's
mandate with Order Number 4, which required all Ba'ath party property to be
turned over "immediately" to the CPA. Further, although the 1907 Hague
Regulations require an occupying power to respect, "unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country," the specificity of the CPA's Order
regarding Ba'ath party property would have overridden any inconsistent local
Iraqi laws at that time. Accordingly, the CPA as the acting administrator of
the occupation in Iraq would have had the power to authorize the IMF to take
temporary custody of these records; reportedly, the CPA not only gave such
authorization, but also provided personnel to assist in the move. On these
facts, the initial actions of the IMF in removing the records from party
headquarters and sequestering them would not appear to be a criminal taking,
much less "pillage" under the 1907 Hague Convention. 258 The CPA, however,
later rescinded its order governing Ba'ath party property when it transferred
253. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 51, at 150. If the United States did properly
confiscate these records, the spoils of war provision in the U.S. Code would technically permit
the United States to transfer ownership to a third party, including an organization such as the
IMF. See 50 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).
254. Franks, supra note 135, at 47.
255. CPA Order No. 4, supra note 137, § 3(3).
256. See 1907 Hague Resolutions, supra note 46, 36 Stat. at 2306, 1 Bevans at 651; CPA,
Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1, § 2, CPA Doc. CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01
(May 16, 2003) [hereinafter CPA Regulation No. 1] (stating that the laws of Iraq "continue to
apply in Iraq insofar as the laws do not prevent the CPA from exercising its rights and fulfilling
its obligations, or conflict with the present or any other Regulation or Order issued by the CPA")
see also CPA, CPA Doc. CPA/ORD/9 June 2003/07, §2(1) (2003) [hereinafter CPA Order No. 7]
(suspending certain provisions of the 1969 Iraqi Penal Code).
257. See Kuyumcu, supra note 235 (stating that the CPA provided "10 trucks and 30
workers" to assist the IMF with the movement of the records).
258. Cf 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 46, art. 28. The rationale and advisability of
the CPA authorization, of course, could remain open to criticism. Further, the issue of whether
the actions of the CPA exceeded the powers of an occupier have been considered elsewhere. See
Fox, supra note 157, at 228-32 (describing the evolution of occupational law and its
consequences).
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sovereignty to the interim Iraqi Government. 259  Therefore, the subsequent
authority of the IMF to continue to hold the records and transport them to the
United States would be coextensive with the consent of the Iraqi government,
the details of which remain in some dispute.
A more difficult issue is whether moving these records to a basement in the
Green Zone to preserve them for historical or cultural purposes began
transforming them into cultural property. The intent of the IMF in moving the
records was to establish "a memorial documentation center similar to
Germany's archive of Stasi secret-police files," and the IMF apparently had
Iraqi governmental approval to create such a "national institution."26 0 If such
records did "ripen" into cultural property, their later removal from Iraq could
arguably implicate various legal restrictions on the transfer of cultural
property; given the apparent consent of the Iraqi government, however, such
restrictions would likely be inapplicable. 261 Further, upon their transfer to the
United States, the U.S. government did not undertake protective measures
typical for the import of foreign cultural property.262  The Federal Register
does not disclose, for example, any State Department filings under the
Immunity from Seizure Act to protect the Ba'ath party records, which could be
of considerable monetary value, from judicial seizure.263 In contrast, in 2003,
259. CPA Order No. 100, supra note 137, § 4(1); see supra note 137 and accompanying text.
260. John Gravois, Disputed Iraqi Records Find a Home at the Hoover Institution, CHRON.
OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 1, 2008, at A1; Eakin, supra note 1.
261. For example, the U.S. implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention incorporates
the Convention's definition of "cultural property," which expressly includes "archives." See
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-446, § 302(6), 96 Stat.
2350, 2351 (1983) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2601(6) (2006)); 1970 UNESCO
Convention, supra note 48, art. 18. In turn, the U.S. Code forbids the import of "cultural property
documented as appertaining to the inventory of a museum or religious or secular nihlic
monument or similar institution in any State Party which is stolen from such institution." 19
U.S.C. § 2607 (2006). Further, in 2004, in lifting sanctions imposed on Iraq in the lead-up to the
1990 war, the United States left in place restrictions on "any transactions with respect to Iraqi
cultural property or other items of archeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious
importance illegally removed from the Iraq National Museum, the National Library, and other
locations in Iraq since August 6, 1990." 31 C.F.R. § 575.533(b)(5) (2009). Similarly, the
Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2004 ultimately resulted in import
restrictions on "archeological and ethnological material," defined as effectively identical to that
covered by the remaining U.S. sanctions on Iraq mentioned above. See Emergency Prot. for Iraqi
Cultural Antiquities Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-429, § 3002, 118 Stat. 2599, 2599; 19 C.F.R. §
12.104j(b) (2009); see also Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological and Ethnological
Material of Iraq, 73 Fed. Reg. 23334, 23335-41 (Apr. 30, 2008) (listing the types of material to
which the import restrictions apply). Therefore, even assuming that such provisions could
encompass Ba'ath party records obtained by the IMF, these restrictions would only apply if the
records had been illegally removed or stolen, which is unlikely given the apparent consent of the
CPA and the Iraqi government.
262. For a discussion of typical measures, see infra text accompanying notes 263-65.
263. See Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological and Ethnological Material of Iraq,
73 Fed. Reg. at 23334-42. The Immunity from Seizure Act allows the Department of State to
shield foreign cultural property from judicial seizure by publishing in the Federal Register a
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the State Department took such protective measures for Iraqi Jewish archives
suffering mold damage that were brought into the United States to be treated
by conservators under the supervision of the U.S. National Archives. 264 If the
Ba'ath party records constitute property of the Iraqi government, the United
States' failure to take this step is puzzling, given the pending suits and default
judgments against the Government of Iraq at the time. 265
Finally, the records' deposit among the established historical archives of the
Hoover Institution further suggests that if they were not initially classified as
cultural property, then they have become cultural property now-a fact that
arguably creates prospective obligations, such as a duty to safeguard them
under the 1954 Hague Convention as a result of their physically being on U.S.
territory.
26 6
2. Cultural Nationalism, Internationalism, and Archives
More broadly, the controversy over Ba'ath party records at the Hoover
Institution reflects a now familiar debate over the repatriation of cultural
property to the countries whose "national culture" they represent. The
distinction between the competing philosophies of "cultural internationalism"
and "cultural nationalism," described most notably in the work of John Henry
Merryman, captures the essence of the debate. 267 "Cultural internationalism"
views collections of cultural property as a part of "common human culture,
whatever their places of origin or present location, independent of property
rights or national jurisdiction. ' 268  In Merryman's view, the 1954 Hague
determination that property brought into the United States for temporary exhibition at a museum,
for example, is both culturally significant and in the national interest. 22 U.S.C. § 2459(a)
(2006).
264. Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition Determinations: Cultural
Artifacts from Iraq, 68 Fed. Reg. 50570 (Aug. 21, 2003) (determining that "the historic and
modem books, documents, parchment scrolls, and other items discovered in early May 2003 in
the basement of the Mukhabahrat in Baghdad, most of which pertain to the Jewish community"
are "of cultural significance" and their importation is "in the national interest"); see Dana Ledger,
Note, Remembrance of Things Past: The Iraqi Jewish Archive and the Legacy of the Iraqi Jewish
Community, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 795, 820-23 (2005) (discussing the application of the
Immunity from Seizure Act to the Iraqi Jewish archives); Ren6 Teijgeler, Preserving Cultural
Heritage in Times of Conflict, in PRESERVATION MANAGEMENT FOR LIBRARIES, ARCHIVES AND
MUSEUMS 133, 149 (G.E. Gorman & Sydney J. Shep eds., 2006) (describing a Memorandum of
Understanding between Iraqi and U.S. officials in relation to the Iraqi Jewish Archive).
265. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES
BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM 32-39 (2008) (discussing the status of lawsuits against Iraq that
involve acts of the Saddam Hussein regime). The risk that a plaintiff against the Government of
Iraq would attempt to seize the Ba'ath party records, which may have been remote to begin with,
became more unlikely when the U.S. Supreme Court held in Iraq v. Beaty that post-Saddam Iraq
is immune from civil suits in U.S. federal courts. Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183, 2195 (2009).
266. See Eskander, Minerva Research Initiative, supra note 2.
267. See John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 831, 846-52 (1986).
268. Id. at 831-32.
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Convention's preamble exemplifies this by declaring that "damage to cultural
property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural
heritage of all mankind." In contrast, "cultural nationalism" stresses the
national "ownership" of cultural property as part of a specific nation's cultural
heritage.270 The 1970 UNESCO Convention represents this trend, which
effectively results in controls on exports and drives the growing "demands for
the 'repatriation' of cultural property."
271
In the case of Ba'ath party records and archives, the tension between these
two views is palpable and acute. On the one hand, there are particularly strong
arguments for keeping Ba'ath party archives in Iraq. First, the relationship
between archives and the nation that created them is more direct than other
forms of cultural property. Records and archives are not simply symbols of
cultural heritage, but are also an integral part of a nation's administration,
culture, and history. 27 2  Second, the function of such records requires a
perception of legitimacy and authenticity, important components of their value,
which can be undermined when the records are not in official custody. 273 Non-
official custody can raise fears-justified or conspiratorial-of forgeries and
fabrications. Third, an unresolved issue is the extent to which the Iraqi
government has ceded power over decisions of access to these records, an
important right and responsibility of any government. 274  Finally, although
269. Id. at 836 (quoting 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 4, preamble).
270. Id. at 832.
271. Id. Merryman uses Greece's demand that England return the Elgin marbles as an
example. Id. For cultural nationalism, Merryman states that the case is a simple one because "the
marbles are Greek, belong in Greece and should be returned to Greece." Id. at 846. For cultural
internationalism, however, "people who are not Greek or British have an interest in their
preservation, integrity and availability for enjoyment and study"; the "repatriation" of the Elgin
marbles to Greece becomes more complicated as "the smog of Athens eats away the marble fabric
of the Parthenon," which results in "all of mankind los[ing] something irreplaceable." Id. at 837.
272. See GRIMSTED, supra note 109, at 493-94. The case for restitution of "archives is even
stronger than for art." Id. (explaining that "[p]aintings or sculpture may appropriately serve as
cultural ambassadors in museums throughout the world, but archives always deserve restitution to
the countries where they belong as the official record, and the inalienable heritage of nations that
created them").
273. Some would argue that the Iraqi records are not in official custody; for example,
Director General Eskander contends that the IMF is not a neutral keeper of the records, but that
"[it] came into being within the framework of the American occupation of Iraq, and thus was an
integral part of a grand imperial vision for the New Iraq." Letter from Saad Eskander to the Dir.
of the Hoover Inst., supra note 245. IMF founder Kenan Makiya had close ties, for example, to
the Bush Administration and was reportedly in the Oval Office with the President when Saddam's
statue was torn down on April 9, 2003. Lawrence F. Kaplan, In Iraq, Silencing Memory, WASH.
POST, July 11, 2004, at B7.
274. See Eakin, supra note I (claiming that at least some Iraqi officials supported the Iraqi
records being handed over to the Hoover Institution). Makiya notes, for example, that these
records contain sensitive information that could be political "dynamite." Id By allowing the
IMF to maintain control of the records, providing a copy of the records to the U.S. government,
and entrusting the originals to the Hoover Institution, the Iraqi government may have limited its
[Vol. 59: 10011050
Iraqi Archives: Records in Armed Conflict
records and archives are not simply symbols, their role as symbols of the
nation is nevertheless crucial.275
On the other hand, arguments inspired by cultural internationalism may be
just as strong. As the Society of American Archivists, echoing the 1954 Hague
Convention, stated at the beginning of the war in 2003, "[w]e all share Iraq's
culture and history," and if records and archives are lost, "the Iraqi people as
well as the citizens of the world lose an important part of our shared cultural
heritage. 276  The IMF's acts of "pillage" may have also been acts of
preservation; for example, had the IMF not removed the records from the
basement of Ba'ath party headquarters, they could have been destroyed during
.... 277
subsequent periods of heightened violence and unrest in Baghdad. Further,
the Hoover Institution stresses that its purpose in holding the archives is to
"preserve andprotect them from deterioration and loss" and to provide access
to them; however, "[g]iven the current conditions in Iraq, one wonders if either
of these goals of preservation or access could be accomplished in Iraq."
278
Finally, given the highly charged political nature of some of these records,
Baghdad may continue to be an unsafe place for them. There are not only
tangible threats to the records, but the extensive publicity about their highly
charged content created by this controversy has made their presence in Iraq
potentially destabilizing to the nation's security.279 The Iraqi government's
apparent agreement with the Hoover Institution to physically and symbolically
keep these records on the other side of the world could have been the result of
a principled decision that, after years of internal violence, the other side of the
world may be where they belong. New negotiations in 2010 may determine
whether the time is yet right for their return.
ability to control access to the materials and to control the purpose for which those materials are
used.
275. UNESCO Consultation Group, supra note 35 (stating that archives "provide a basis for
national identity").
276. Soc'y of Am. Archivists, supra note 133.
277. See Eakin, supra note 1. In fact, as recent as 2007, there were urgent international calls
for assistance in protecting the collections after Iraqi National Guard troops "illegally and
unnecessarily occupied the Iraq National Library and Archives." Soc'y of Am. Archivists, Iraq
National Library and Archives in Jeopardy (Aug. 8, 2007), http://www.archivists.org/news/iraqi_
archives-07.asp.
278. Letter from Richard Sousa to Mark A. Green, supra note 243, at 1. The access issue
may be successfully argued in both ways, reflecting the multiple stakeholders in government
information. For example, the Iraqi government has a legitimate interest in its own national
security; others, including Iraqi citizens, may have an interest in the information contained in
those records that the Iraqi government might seek to conceal for security purposes. Id (noting
that, although the documents must be protected, limited access to the records would impede a
general understanding of the regime's history).
279. See Eakin, supra note I (discussing Makiya's recognition of the value and potentially
destructive contents of the records in dispute).
280. See Banerjee, supra note 249.
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V. THE FUTURE OF RECORDS AND ARCHIVES IN WAR
The limitations of international law in dealing with records and archives in
armed conflict are not easily remedied. Significant efforts have been
undertaken to provide further protection for cultural property b narrowing, or
. • ,2 8 1
eliminating altogether, the standard for "military necessity. Such efforts,
however, even if successful in altering relevant provisions, are restricted in
their practical effect. This would be especially true in regards to records and
archives because of their potential military and intelligence value. As former
acting Archivist of the United States, Trudy Huskamp Peterson, notes, "Armies
seize every type of document they encounter, and they are likely to continue to
do so, irrespective of what the Conventions say."
2 82
A more modest ambition for the development of international law would be
to directly acknowledge the unique, and sometimes conflicting, nature of
records and archives and to focus on clarifying their long-term status. Patricia
Kennedy Grimsted, for example, characterizes captured archives displaced
during World War II that were never returned as "prisoners of war."
283
Treating captured records and archives as prisoners of war would, in fact, be a
significant step forward.284 To do so would effectively legalize the principle of
archival inalienability for which the international archival community
281. The 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, for example, allows a waiver
for imperative military necessity only where cultural property "has, by its function, been made
into a military objective." Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 70, art.
6(a)(i). This is more restrictive than the "military objective" standard in Geneva Protocol I. See
Geneva Protocol I, supra note 49, art. 52 (stating that military objectives are "those objects which
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage").
282. Peterson, supra note 21, at 273-74. Similarly, in his review of the 1954 Hague
Convention, Patrick Boylan notes, with regard to its First Protocol, that "[u]nfortunately[,] all the
evidence suggests that the provisions are almost totally ineffective in practice." Review of the
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, supra note 4,
at 100; see Leopold Auer, Restitution of Removed Records Following War, in INTERDEPENDENCE
OF ARCHIVES, supra note 25, at 172, 174 ("National pride, national interest, mass media
campaigns or even ... the reluctance of custodial institutions to return seized archives may be
sometimes a greater obstacle to overcome than legal questions. Practice does not always obey
principles."). Further, the only international convention that has attempted to deal with archives
in detail and at length, the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State
Property, Archives and Debts, United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of
State Property, Archives and Debts, Mar. 1-Apr. 8, 1983, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 117/4 (Apr. 8,
1983), has never entered into force and is an unqualified failure. See GRIMSTED, ODYSSEY,
supra note 117, at 96-97.
283. GRIMSTED, supra note 109, at 495 ("Archives deserve to be liberated from the status of
trophies of empire or prisoners of war.").
284. Interestingly, the U.S. Army requires that troops attach "a DD Form 2745 (Enemy
Prisoner of War Capture Tag)" to each captured enemy-document for purposes of accountability.
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52), HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS
app. I, art 1-14 (2006) [hereinafter DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 2-22.3].
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advocates. 285 International law could treat records and archives that are not
entirely of a civilian character like enemy combatants, who may be killed or
captured when military necessity requires, but who are only detained
temporarily and must be repatriated "without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities."
286
A still more modest advance would be simply to enhance both the long-term
access to seized records and the protection that foreign custody provides them.
Archivist Leopold Auer advocates, for example, for rules requiring
"unrestricted access to displaced archives for the sake of scholarly research and
in the interest of individuals who may be concerned," as well as for "a binding
rule that every occupying power exploiting captured archives be obligated to
maintain archival and file integrity by leaving all documents in their existing
file context. 287
In many ways, international law already provides practical guidance. The
core principles of the 1954 Hague Convention, for example, are guideposts for
realistic and feasible measures to protect historical records. This guidance
includes the importance of planning in peace for protection in war; the
imposition of responsibilities on both the defending population as well as the
attacking forces; and the acknowledgement of the reality and inevitability of
288assertions of military necessity, legitimate or otherwise. The Second
Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention builds on these principles in
uncontroversial provisions that encourage the use of preservation techniques
such as "the preparation of inventories, the planning of emergency measures
for protection against fire or structural collapse, the preparation for the removal
of movable cultural property or the provision for adequate in situ
,,289protection. Patty Gerstenblith has suggested an additional protocol
285. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
286. Third 1949 Geneva Convention, supra note 47, art. 118; see Peterson, supra note 21, at
274 (arguing that, after analysis, the capturing state should "return all documents not required for
military or intelligence needs, either to the individual, the institution, or the successor state").
287. Auer, supra note 282, at 177. Archivist Trudy Huskamp Peterson argues for the basic
and reasonable proposition that simplifying the rules regarding captured records would be an
effective improvement. Peterson, supra note 21, at 274.
288. See generally Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 168, at 2-10. In daily practice,
archivists almost never rely on legal compliance as a preservation strategy. Despite laws against
theft, for example, archives impose strict protective measures, requiring that all visitors, including
the most well-respected, leave bags and jackets at the door, because even former government
officials with the highest security clearances can present a potential threat to government
documents. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Ex-Clinton Advisor to Admit Taking Classified Papers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at A14.
289. Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 70, art. 5; see Teijgeler,
supra note 264, at 141-42 (discussing the practical measures for the preservation of archives).
Microfilm presents a particularly useful strategy for the preservation of records and archives.
See, e.g., Hartmut Weber, How to Survive a War, INFORM, June 1990, at 44. Beginning in 1961,
for example, then-West Germany initiated a "Security Microfilming Program" in which it made
microfilm copies of records and archives throughout the country and stored them in a refuge
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that incorporates modem cultural resource management principles.290
Further, by accepting the reality that records and archives that have potential
value to an adversary will always be at risk of capture or destruction, the
interests of an archivist and the aims of opposing forces are aligned in many
ways. 291 The preservation of record and archival collections, including the
integrity of their organization and context, is also important for military
intelligence analysis as well as counterinsurgency and stability operations.
2 92
During World War 1I, the Supreme Commander for allied forces issued
guidance to military commanders noting "the importance of archives not only
as individual documents but as related series which might be ruined by the
displacement of a few documents. '293 In order to protect archives from this
danger, he directed that "all buildings in which they were housed were to be,
whenever practicable, placed 'off limits,' to all troops." 294  However, this
instruction was not designed simply to protect cultural heritage; preserving
context was also important to exploit accurately the political and intelligence
value of those "archives" or record centers for the advancing Allied forces.
295
inside of a Freiburg mine in order to create a "high-quality duplicate heritage." Id. For a
discussion of international microfilming efforts, see Anthony Farrington, The ICA's International
Microfilming Project, Is There a Future?, in INTERDEPENDENCE OF ARCHIVES, supra note 25, at
120.
290. Gerstenblith, supra note 17, at 346-49.
291. These shared interests obviously have limitations. See, e.g., ITALIAN ARCHIVES
DURING THE WAR AND AT ITS CLOSE, supra note 33 (describing the dangers to records and
archives in Italy in World War II from the "indiscreet zeal in exploitation" for intelligence
purposes); Eric Ketelaar, Archivists in War, in INTERDEPENDENCE OF ARCHIVES, supra note 25,
at 159, 162 (noting that in World War II "the aims of officers collecting records for intelligence
purposes and those engaged in protecting archives were often incompatible, which led to
difficulties over competencies within the army, comparable to the battles which raged outside the
army: between the civilian and the military").
292. See Dick Jackson, Cultural Property Protection in Stability Operations, THE ARMY
LAW. 47, 47 (2008) (arguing that the "protection of cultural property should serve as a key focal
point in stability operations and counter-insurgency efforts by the U.S. military, even if such
protection is not required as a matter of law"); DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 3-24,
COUNTERINSURGENCY § 3-153, at 3-29 (2006) (noting the use of census and property records in
determining "who should or should not be living in a specific area" in order to "secure the
populace").
293. AM. COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION AND SALVAGE OF ARTISTIC AND HISTORIC
MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS, supra note 11.
294. Id.
295. See ITALIAN ARCHIVES DURING THE WAR AND AT ITS CLOSE, supra note 33, at 21.
Notably, in Italy,
[i]ntelligence Officers were liable to carry off whole files, to remove single papers
from their related documents, to disturb the order of papers, and so on, without
realizing that, by doing so, they were not only impairing the historical value of the
collection but also impeding the work of other Agencies that might follow them.
Id.; see Ketelaar, supra note 291, at 162 (noting that "exploitation and protection, should in
reality not be so opposed" and that "[m]uch better intelligence results could be obtained from
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Finally, the impact of war and military capture is not necessarily negative.
Wars can liberate the records of a regime that would otherwise never see the
296light of day. Public disclosure of captured classified documents sometimes
can have an effect similar to the New York Times publishing the Pentagon
Papers-a kind of emancipation of historical records. Wartime intelligence
operations can have ancillary preservation benefits as well. During World War
II, for example, the Office of Strategic Services, a precursor to the Central
Intelligence Agency, microfilmed a broad range of foreign materials for
intelligence purposes.2 9 8  Historian Kathy Peiss states that this "massive
microfilming effort itself preserved many publications that would otherwise
have disappeared from the human record, including obscure journals with
small print runs, underground newspapers, and resistance pamphlets. ' '299 She
further notes that, in "a classic case of unintended consequences, the
government's need for intelligence had a greater impact on the fate of books
than did the organizations whose mandate was cultural protection. ' 300
VI. CONCLUSION
The ongoing controversies over the fate of Ba'ath party documents betray an
understandable uncertainty about the legal status of records and archives in
armed conflict. The unique characteristics of records create a hybrid of enemy
property and cultural property that international law has thus far been unable to
address adequately. Any attempt to provide enhanced protection to archives in
war or resolve debates over their long-term fate must acknowledge the
inadequacies of international law and should focus on modest and realistic
measures that build upon the common goals of combatants and archivists. As
Jenkinson and Bell noted in World War II
material not ransacked chaotically"). The updated U.S. Army manual on interrogations, for
example, contains an entire appendix entitled "Document Exploitation and Handling," which
includes requirements about documenting custody and details of capture and organization. DEP'T
OF THE ARMY, FM 2-22.3, supra note 284, at app. I.
296. Archivists viewed German records seized during World War 1I as a "great historic
treasure." Francis L. Loewenheim, Guides to Microfilmed German Records: A Review, 22 AM.
ARCHIVIST 445, 445 (1959); see Perman, supra note 9 (discussing the "opportunity now afforded
to historians" to "have available documents of the Hitler era in Germany reflecting its origins,
causes, administrative system, philosophy, policies, military system, propaganda, and almost
every other imaginable feature of significance").
297. In upholding the right of the New York Times to publish the Pentagon Papers, classified
government documents about the Vietnam War, former Justice Hugo Black explained that the
press was constitutionally protected "so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform
the people." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (per curiam)
(Black, J., concurring).
298. Kathy Peiss, Cultural Property in a Time of War: The American Response to
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Whatever may be the position in International Law of the
Archives of a State that is fought over ... no modern State can, in
fact, afford to countenance their wholesale destruction. Protective
measures may be undertaken with very different motives, good or
bad; but some form of protection there is bound to be.
301
Realistic protection of records and archives by international law will only
come by approaching their dual nature as an opportunity rather than an
obstacle.
301. ITALIAN ARCHIVES DURING THE WAR AND AT ITS CLOSE, supra note 33, at 3.
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